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WHEN PROSECUTORS POLITICK: 
PROGRESSIVE LAW ENFORCERS THEN 
AND NOW 
BRUCE A. GREEN & REBECCA ROIPHE* 
A new and recognizable group of reform-minded prosecutors has 
assumed the mantle of progressive prosecution. The term is hard to define in 
part because its adherents embrace a diverse set of policies and priorities. 
In comparing the contemporary movement with Progressive Era 
prosecutors, this Article has two related goals. First, it seeks to better define 
progressive prosecution. Second, it uses a historical comparison to draw 
some lessons for the current movement. Both groups of prosecutors were 
elected on a wave of popular support. Unlike today’s mainstream 
prosecutors who tend to campaign and labor in relative obscurity, these two 
sets of prosecutors received a good deal of popular attention and support. 
The Progressive Era reformers introduced the notion promoted by current 
progressive prosecutors that crime is a social phenomenon, which 
community services are better equipped to address than prisons. The 
Progressive Era movement also sought to implement professional norms and 
practices to promote the values of fairness and proportionality. 
Contemporary progressive prosecutors inherit this legacy but tend not to 
emphasize these professional values. The Article concludes that the 
professional values championed during the Progressive Era are critical, in 
conjunction with new programs and policies, to ensure that as innovation 
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helps achieve social justice, prosecution remains in the hands of those 
committed to fair and even-handed justice.  
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 720 
I. CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM  
IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA ................................................. 722 
A. Progressive Era Prosecutors .............................................. 722 
B. Rationalization and Bureaucratization of Criminal Justice 723 
C. Professionalization ............................................................ 726 
D. Criminal Justice as Social Welfare .................................... 730 
E. The Legacy of Prosecutorial Professionalism ................... 733 
II. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY “PROGRESSIVE 
PROSECUTORS” .................................................................. 736 
A. Framing the New Progressive Prosecution Movement ..... 737 
B. The Rise of the New Progressive Prosecution Movement 738 
C. Comparing Progressive Prosecutors to Their Progressive Era 
Predecessors .................................................................... 746 
1. The Politics of Criminal Justice Reform ..................... 747 
2. Lenity in Aid of Proportionality and Equality ............ 750 
3. Categorical Presumptions of Lenity ............................ 757 
4. Holistic Prosecuting .................................................... 761 
III. LESSONS FROM HISTORY ..................................................... 762 
Conclusion ......................................................................................... 766 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 2016, “progressive prosecutors” have won elections on promises 
to reduce mass incarceration and redress the unfair treatment of the poor and 
minorities in the criminal justice system.1 The progressive politics of the day 
have filtered into prosecutorial elections, and prosecutors are drawing on a 
populist movement to fuel their campaigns and platforms.2 Their election as 
 
 1 Mark Berman, These Prosecutors Won Office Vowing to Fight the System. Now, the 
System Is Fighting Back., WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2019, 4:52 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/these-prosecutors-won-office-vowing-to-fight-
the-system-now-the-system-is-fighting-back/2019/11/05/20d863f6-afc1-11e9-a0c9-
6d2d7818f3da_story.html [https://perma.cc/K6XK-F5CM]; see infra Part II(A).  
 2 Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 51, 87–93, 100–07 (2016) (describing how public and regulatory efforts to hold 
prosecutors accountable for misconduct and abuse have been fueled by, among other things, 
“public disenchantment with the criminal process,” reform coalitions and movements, and 
information technology). 
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district and county attorneys marks a significant break from the law-and-
order approach to prosecution that dominated for decades.3 
This is not the first time that reformers pursued a new approach to 
prosecution. The Progressive Era reform movement in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries included a promise to overhaul an outdated, corrupt 
criminal justice system, including replacing corrupt prosecutors who 
belonged to the party machines. While the Progressive Era and the present 
are not the only times when criminal law reform has been pressing,4 these 
particular historical periods are worth comparing because, in both cases, 
prosecutor elections were and are politically salient, drawing significant 
attention and popular support.  
The Progressive Era criminal justice reform movement had several 
defining features. Its aim was to combat corruption by professionalizing 
criminal justice: reformers sought to replace political cronies with 
disinterested experts who applied the law to facts rather than basing their 
decisions on impermissible personal, partisan, or political considerations.5 
Progressive Era reformers also rejected nineteenth-century notions of free 
will and personal responsibility, believing instead that biology and 
environment shaped individuals’ conduct.6 Finally, criminal justice 
reformers sought to bring rational business management to chaotic courts. 
During this era, lawyers seeking election as prosecutors under the reform 
banner, most famously William Travers Jerome of Manhattan, challenged 
office holders who were beholden to a political party and dedicated to 
 
 3 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Three Lessons for Criminal Law Reformers from Locking 
Up Our Own, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1967, 1969–70 (2019) (contrasting progressive prosecutors 
with “traditional ‘tough-on-crime’” prosecutors). 
 4 Obviously, criminal justice reform has been important at many, if not all, points in 
American history. We are simply suggesting that the two reform movements are worth 
comparing because they involve a unique common feature. For a discussion of the use of 
history in legal scholarship, see Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case 
of History-in-Law, 71 CHI.-. KENT L. REV. 909 (1996). Tushnet argues that history is a form 
of storytelling. Id. at 914–17. The story we tell in this article is not one of decline or 
progressive victory. It is rather a story of oscillation, consistency about some things and 
extreme swings in sentiment about others. A lesson we draw from this story is that as we 
embrace change, it might be useful to moderate the nature of change with some useful lessons 
of the past. 
 5 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 149–71 
(1993). 
 6 See generally THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: 
THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF 
AUTHORITY (1977) (discussing the shift from personal responsibility to environmental 
explanations for social phenomena); MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE 
REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (Beacon paperback ed. 1957) (describing a shift from formalism 
to a more pragmatic, historical, and socially grounded philosophy). 
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powerful and moneyed interests.7 The legacy of disinterested and 
independent prosecutorial professionalism, which Jerome exemplified, is 
now widely accepted, if not taken for granted.  
This Article compares the new progressive prosecutors to the 
Progressive Era criminal justice reformers to identify the benefits and 
concerns that accompany a prosecutorial reform movement linked to popular 
politics. The successes and failures of Progressive Era criminal justice reform 
offer a cautionary tale to progressive prosecutors who draw on active popular 
support to feed their campaigns and platforms. While populist energy lends 
momentum and political will for positive change, it can also be in tension 
with professional values. The Article concludes that contemporary 
progressive prosecutors ought to take care not to sacrifice professionalism to 
broader social justice policy goals. The Article also cautions that, although a 
focus on the social context in which crime occurs is progress from the cruder 
nineteenth-century conception of free will and personal responsibility, it too 
has its dangers.  
Part I of the Article describes the criminal justice reform movement 
during the Progressive Era and its legacy. Part II then turns to contemporary 
progressive prosecutors. Focusing especially on the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion, it highlights how progressive prosecutors have distinguished 
themselves from their mainstream contemporaries and, in doing so, how they 
compare with Progressive Era reformers. Finally, Part III offers some lessons 
from history.  
 
 I. CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 
A. PROGRESSIVE ERA PROSECUTORS  
Beginning around 1870, the progressive movement emerged to address 
the increasingly complex problems of industrial capitalism in America. The 
rapidly changing economy brought an influx of new immigrants from 
southern and eastern Europe, as well as a migration of a large number of 
African Americans from the South to northern cities. The social problems 
were complex: overcrowding, increases in crime, clashing of cultures, and 
more. These new conditions were accompanied by harsh working conditions, 
 
 7 RICHARD O’CONNOR, COURTROOM WARRIOR: THE COMBATIVE CAREER OF WILLIAM 
TRAVERS JEROME 74–82 (1963); ARTHUR TRAIN, FROM THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE: A 
POPULAR ACCOUNT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 116 (1939). 
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poverty, child labor, and more women in the workforce.8 While the 
progressive movement was in no way monolithic, its proponents shared a 
concern about these social conditions and came to a consensus on some 
common causes and means to address them.9 
One target of the Progressive Era reform movement was criminal 
justice. The conditions of urban America, along with the increased 
concentration of people from diverse communities, contributed to an increase 
in crime and corruption.10 The Progressive Era reformers sought to address 
this in various ways. This Part highlights three aspects of the Progressive Era 
criminal justice reform movement that had particular significance for 
criminal prosecutors: Section B examines Progressive Era reformers’ focus 
on administrative efficiency; Section C looks at their faith in expertise and 
professionalization; and Section D underscores their belief that crime was a 
symptom of a larger social problem. Finally, Section E focuses on what we 
regard as Progressive Era prosecutors’ most significant legacy for 
contemporary prosecutors: their conception of prosecutors’ professional role 
and responsibilities. 
B. RATIONALIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIZATION OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 
The Progressive Era was the heyday of muckrakers, the journalists and 
social reformers who sought to shed light on the corruption, inefficiency, and 
evils of industrial capitalism. The most famous of their works was Upton 
Sinclair’s The Jungle, which described the harsh conditions of immigrant 
workers in Chicago and exposed the unsanitary conditions of America’s meat 
packing plants.11 Along these lines—albeit in a far less dramatic way—
 
 8 Progressive Era reform was in no way monolithic, nor were its causes simple.  For a 
historiographical account of the various strains within the progressive movement, see Daniel 
T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REVS. AM. HIST. 113 (1982). 
 9 See generally id.  
 10 DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS 
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 51–52 (rev. ed. 2002). 
 11 While Sinclair sought to advance socialism, his book mostly sparked upset and outrage 
at the unsanitary conditions of the meat packing industry, leading ultimately to the passage of 
the Federal Meat Inspection Act in 1906.  See BROOKE KROEGER, UNDERCOVER REPORTING: 
THE TRUTH ABOUT DECEPTION 84, 89–90 (2012) (“I aimed at the public’s heart and by 
accident I hit it in the stomach.”) (quoting Sinclair); see generally UPTON SINCLAIR, THE 
JUNGLE (1906) (following the lives of fictional immigrants who work in Chicago’s meat 
industry). 
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reformers described, in minute detail, the sluggish inefficiency and venality 
of municipal courts.12 
The municipal courts in Cleveland, for instance, were populated by 
prosecutors who knew nothing about the cases, carried no papers, and kept 
few files.13 Cases were disposed of without public scrutiny. Prosecutors 
whispered in the ears of the judges, who issued decisions to continue the case 
or impose a light penalty, while defense attorneys drifted around the room 
doing little to nothing.14 Courts were dirty, dark, and noisy, belying any 
misconceived sense of the administration of impartial justice.15 As urban 
planner and reformer Alfred Bettman and his co-author Howard F. Burns put 
it, anyone would be left with the impression that “results are dependent upon 
favor or strange influences [rather] than upon a judgment of the court based 
exclusively on the dictates of law and justice.”16 Drawing on the efficiency 
movement pioneered by Frederick Taylor and others, criminal justice 
reformers hoped to make courts look more like businesses than government 
agencies.17 
The inefficiency of prosecutors’ offices, like that of the courts, made 
them susceptible to corruption. The lack of documentation and the individual 
prosecutors’ power to dismiss cases bred a sense that criminal justice was for 
sale to those with political, social, or financial influence.18 When asked why 
he did not discipline his subordinates when they neglected their cases or acted 
 
 12 See generally RAYMOND FOSDICK, REGINALD HEBER SMITH, HERBERT B. EHRMANN, 
ALFRED BETTMAN, HOWARD F. BURNS, BURDETTE G. LEWIS, HERMAN M. ADLER, ALBERT M. 
KALES, M.K. WISEHART, FELIX FRANKFURTER & ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
CLEVELAND: REPORTS OF THE CLEVELAND FOUNDATION SURVEY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND, OHIO (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922) 
[hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND] (reporting on corruption in the criminal courts 
in Cleveland). 
 13 Alfred Bettman & Howard F. Burns, Prosecution, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND, 
supra note 12, at 83, 98–99. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 109–10. 
 17 The efficiency movement argued that the economy, society, and government were 
riddled with inefficiency.  Proponents like Frederick Winslow Taylor proposed to bring expert 
management to bear on these problems to reduce waste.  The movement favored 
administrative and executive expertise over popular participation or control and assumed that 
proper management would not only reduce waste but also eliminate most conflict.  See 
generally FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 
(1911). For a discussion of the movement, see generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE 
VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); SAMUEL 
HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFT: SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890–
1920 (1964). 
 18 See Bettman & Burns, supra note 13, at 136–38. 
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improperly, one reform prosecutor in Cleveland responded that he had no 
control over the assistant prosecutors, who “were appointed just as he was.”19 
A county prosecutor developed a policy of keeping assistant prosecutors in 
the dark about their cases until shortly before trial so they would not have the 
time to corruptly drop or block a prosecution.20 
Reformers insisted that the municipal prosecutor ought to be like an 
executive of a large business or the managing clerk of a law office.21 
Specialization, a key goal of the efficiency movement, was seen as critical to 
the proper functioning of prosecutors’ offices. The reformers were convinced 
that the existing system, in which prosecutors handled all different sorts and 
stages of cases, had led to both corruption and amateurism. Specialization 
would breed expertise while helping to ensure oversight such that no one 
prosecutor could corrupt the system. Thus, as in a factory, some prosecutors 
should serve as trial assistants and others should manage police-initiated 
charges, while another set should deal with complaints from the 
community.22 Prosecutors would become experts in their work, a key to the 
impartial administration of justice, the legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system, and the efficient functioning of the system. As Bettman and Burns 
concluded in the volume edited by Felix Frankfurter and Roscoe Pound, the 
efficient and organized administration of justice was critical, but would fail 
without the skilled and professional exercise of discretion and judgment.23 
Reformers understood that increased efficiency would come at a cost to 
participatory democracy. While susceptible to corruption, the old model was 
also fluid and informal. In the old system, complainants could speak directly 
to judges, witnesses, victims, and the accused, and spoke with one another 
and interacted casually to bargain for a desired result. While not all parties 
were equal in this spoils system, anyone could join the fray. Reformers 
wanted a structure with rules and processes, something more arcane that 
would no doubt make the process less accessible. As rules and procedures 
grew more intricate and were more consistently enforced, individuals 
accused of crimes as well as other participants had to rely on lawyers to 
navigate the system. However, the imposition of rational systems, rules, and 
processes would also help weed out corruption and ensure fair results, an end 
that seemed pressing given that individual liberty was at stake.24  
 
 19 Id. at 119. 
 20 Id. at 162–63. 
 21 Id. at 194–95; MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN 
PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO 7 (2003). 
 22 Bettman & Burns, supra note 13, at 195–96. 
 23 Id. at 196. 
 24 WILLRICH, supra note 21, at 30–32. 
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C. PROFESSIONALIZATION 
Progressive Era courtroom reformers largely targeted corruption. The 
urban criminal courts had become a tool of party machine politics or, as one 
contemporary argued, captive to the joint interest of municipal politics and 
big business.25 Rich, well-connected parties got their way. Others were given 
little attention and often had no way to pursue their complaints or defend 
against allegations of wrongdoing. Progressive Era reformers envisioned 
professionalism as part of the solution.26 
The perceived need for professionalism extended to prosecutors’ 
offices. As Roscoe Pound described in his book about criminal justice in 
Cleveland, prosecutors lacked competence, knowledge, and training.27 They 
were chosen for their political connections, not for their mastery of the law.28 
The public suspected that they were carrying on private practices while 
prosecuting cases, exposing them to persistent conflicts of interest.29 Bettman 
and Burns concluded that the office of the prosecutor had to be reformed so 
as “to attract and hold men of ability and character.”30 Arthur Train insisted 
that, at least for the top prosecutor, character was the more important trait: 
“Courtesy, courage, broadmindedness, and scrupulous integrity are needed 
rather than legal ratiocination.”31 
The elite bar at the turn of the century looked down on lawyers who 
practiced criminal law. Reformers sought to improve the image of 
prosecutors to match the import of their work. As observers of the Cleveland 
system explained: 
The criminal branch of the administration of justice, dealing as it does with the 
protection of the community against crime, the promotion of the peace, safety, and 
 
 25 TRAIN, supra note 7, at 120–22; see also O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 33–34. 
 26 See generally BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM: THE MIDDLE 
CLASS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA (1976) (arguing in that 
professionalism emerged as a way of consolidating middle class status and giving it meaning); 
HASKELL, supra note 6 (arguing that professionalization became a way of addressing social 
problems and organizing social activity); DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL 
SCIENCE (1991) (arguing that the social sciences emerged as a way of recasting ideological 
views of American exceptionalism); Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in 
the Age of American Enterprise: 1870–1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES 
IN AMERICA 70 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983) (discussing how lawyers used new economic 
theories to support their vision of reform). 
 27 See Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice and the American City, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
CLEVELAND, supra note 12, at 559, 622–23. 
 28 Bettman & Burns, supra note 13, at 133. 
 29 Id. at 156. 
 30 Id. at 194. 
 31 TRAIN, supra note 7, at 128–29. 
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morals of the inhabitants, the lives and the liberties of men, and, therefore, from any 
intelligent point of view, the more important branch of the administration of the law, 
has become a sort of outlaw field which many a lawyer avoids as he avoids the slums 
of the city.32 
Reformers understood that the chief prosecutor in particular ought to be 
a professional, possessing skill and training, but also the capacity and 
inclination to resist public influence. As Bettman and Burns put it, it should 
not be that 
the prosecutor permits himself to be carried hither or thither by alternating currents of 
public cruelty or public sentimentality or blown about by gusts of popular or press 
excitement. He should be the captain who steadies the boat and at the same time 
discovers new or improved routes to the havens of public order, security, and morals.33 
The solution was to improve the prestige and professional status of the 
prosecutor’s office34 by hiring professional prosecutors who adhered to 
proper processes instead of using any means to achieve conviction.35 
One of the most famous Progressive Era reform prosecutors, William 
Travers Jerome, posed a threat to the traditional party system and its loyal 
district attorneys because he was honest and incorruptible.36 He derived his 
power directly from the people and won favor with the poor and the rich 
alike, posing a distinct threat to the entrenched politicians.37 As one editorial 
writer explained during his campaign: “If the people want blackmailers and 
other criminals vigorously prosecuted without fear or favor they will elect 
Judge Jerome.”38 When he was elected, Jerome sought to professionalize the 
New York County District Attorney’s office by hiring young lawyers who 
were just a few years out of law school.39 He used recommendations by civic 
groups, well-respected lawyers, or both to fill the office with professional 
assistants.40 One observer complained, “[i]n the ould days a feller could use 
his pull; now, the divil take it, to get anythin’ done you got to hold up your 
hand and yell ‘Hay-vard, Hay-vard, Hay-vard.’”41 
 
 32 Bettman & Burns, supra note 13, at 219. 
 33 Id. at 198. 
 34 See id. at 194. 
 35 See TRAIN, supra note 7, at 130–31. 
 36 See O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 35–36, 44, 53. 
 37 See id. at 79. 
 38 Id. at 81. 
 39 Id. at 86. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 87. 
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Arthur Train, who served as a prosecutor in Manhattan both before and 
after Jerome’s election,42 described prosecutors’ previous approach to their 
work: “Prior to the muckraking era the traditional concept of a prosecutor 
was that of a bull-necked gladiator with an undershot jaw, whose only object 
was to convict every unfortunate charged with crime, whether innocent or 
guilty.”43 This thought captured prosecutors’ indifference to the evidence and 
to the possible innocence of the accused. It also conveyed prosecutors’ 
excessive harshness, at least toward the working class and the poor.  
In contrast, Jerome was particularly forgiving of those charged with 
petty offenses, focusing instead on what he regarded as more serious crimes, 
particularly corruption.44 He believed a harsher approach toward the poor 
would erode his popular support and undermine the reform effort.45 But 
Jerome’s bid for popular support in this respect coincided with a conception 
of prosecutorial professionalism, which called for making decisions based on 
a sense of proportionality rather than on popular preference in individual 
cases. While a more lenient attitude toward criminals was not central to the 
Progressive Era prosecutors’ mission, it was a policy advanced by individual 
prosecutors, such as Jerome, who were committed to preventing crime 
instead of simply punishing it.46 For instance, Jerome often expressed 
compassion for defendants. Assistant prosecutors reported that Jerome 
sometimes intervened personally in cases that his office had worked hard to 
win, asking for leniency for a convicted felon.47 
To Jerome, equal treatment of the rich and poor was just as important 
as proportionality. When Jerome was elected, Train explained, the criminal 
process was marked not just by inefficiency, but also by a particular breed of 
corruption in which poor and rich were treated unequally.48 Criminal justice 
was for sale. It was “prize ring” justice in which the rich controlled all the 
fighting men.49 Another reformer argued that “our penal machinery seems to 
recruit its victims from among those that are fighting an unequal fight in the 
struggle for existence.”50 The populist, class-based rhetoric, however, was 
 
 42 Id. at 78. 
 43 TRAIN, supra note 7, at 116. 
 44 See O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 63, 70. 
 45 Id. at 63–64. 
 46 In New York, the concern about corruption accompanied a fear that prosecutors were 
too soft on crime.  Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in 
Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1338 (2002). 
 47 O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 120. 
 48 TRAIN, supra note 7, at 120–22. 
 49 Id. at 117–18. 
 50 JOHN P. ALTGELD, LIVE QUESTIONS: INCLUDING OUR PENAL MACHINERY AND ITS 
VICTIMS 168 (1890) (emphasis omitted). 
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confined to a description of the problem. The solution was not to hand the 
system to the public but to conduct it with greater efficiency and 
professionalism. Reformers identified the key defect in the existing criminal 
justice system as the cozy attitude between prosecutors and politicians—that 
is, prosecutors’ lack of independence from political bosses and the criminal 
element.51 
Jerome’s tenure as head prosecutor highlighted the tension between 
professionalism and populism. Notwithstanding his commitment to 
professionalizing criminal justice, Jerome employed populist rhetoric. In one 
speech to a group of wealthy individuals at Carnegie Hall, he raged: “You 
are too respectable to care about the teeming tenements and the hovels where 
crouch in darkness a million people of this city.”52 But Jerome resolved the 
tension in favor of professionalism in the exercise of authority. Unlike many 
populists who argued that the working class should have more direct control 
of the government,53 Jerome insisted that it was the wealthy who had a special 
obligation to run the city well: “Every dollar you have laid by, every step you 
have climbed in the social scale has laid upon you an obligation of civic 
leadership, and you have failed. You are not bad people. You are heartless 
people and, above all, stupid people.”54 
While professionalism was the antidote offered for the ills that seemed 
to plague the criminal courts, popular prosecutors could fall victim to their 
own rhetoric. For instance, as District Attorney, Jerome tangled with Howe 
and Hummel, the most famous defense firm in the city and reportedly one of 
the most corrupt.55 He set out to destroy Abe Hummel, or “Little Abe,” who 
was the underworld’s most effective advocate.56 Like a superhero battling his 
nemesis, Jerome sought to destroy Hummel once and for all. Having caught 
one of Hummel’s famously dissolute and corrupt clients, Jerome fed a story 
to the press that Hummel himself might escape prison if he agreed to 
cooperate against his clients.57 Removing an effective defense lawyer in this 
way, even if he was entangled in the corrupt activities of those he represented, 
hardly seems to exemplify a fair and professional criminal justice system. 
Thus, while he promoted a professional office dedicated to following the 
 
 51 See Ramsey, supra note 46, at 1343–45. 
 52 O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 77. 
 53 David Fontana, Unbundling Populism, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1482, 1486–87 (2018). 
 54 O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 77. 
 55 Id. at 121–45. 
 56 Id. at 122. 
 57 Id. at 139–43. 
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evidence, Jerome took a personal interest in pursuing his opponent, defying 
the maxim that prosecutors ought to pursue evidence, not individuals.58 
Ultimately, though, it was Jerome’s commitment to professionalism, 
and his unwillingness to play to a populist demand, that ended his career as 
a prosecutor. By 1907, the public began to grow impatient with the 
prosecution of corrupt local officials.59 Instead, they wanted Jerome to go 
after Wall Street and the moneyed trusts.60 Many of his own reform allies 
balked as he grew more interested in rooting out local corruption than in 
leading a fight against powerful wealthy families like the Morgans, 
Whitneys, and Harrimans.61 Ironically, while his success was built on fair 
treatment for all and leniency for less fortunate criminals, he was accused in 
the end of creating “two kinds of law—one for the rich and one for the 
poor.”62 The professional approach did not, in the end, satisfy the populist 
demand. 
D. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AS SOCIAL WELFARE 
Part of the professionalization project involved a scientific approach to 
crime. Progressivism in general was devoted to the proper diagnosis of social 
problems.63 The social sciences emerged as a popular field in part because of 
the promise to describe social problems in a scientific way.64 A careful, 
unbiased study of the causes of crime was considered essential to any 
solution. While this seems obvious now, it marked a departure from the 
nineteenth-century focus on individual responsibility and retribution.65 
Progressive Era reformers observed and responded to the 
interconnectedness of the social fabric. The individual was no longer 
 
 58 Before being elected District Attorney, Jerome also cut corners as a judge.  As an anti-
corruption crusader, trailed by reporters, he would enter brothels and gambling clubs, holding 
trials and cross-examining witnesses on the spot without regard to rules of evidence and 
procedures.  Id. at 69–71.  The pursuit of professionalism did not always live up to its own 
aspirations, in part because its proponents, like Jerome, depended on popular support. 
 59 O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 252–53. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 253.  While the Progressive Era was diverse and there was no one political or 
social agenda, the movement shared certain themes, one of which was anti-monopolism, 
which could take the form of a populist rage against concentration of wealth and power.  See 
Rodgers, supra note 8, at 123. 
 62 O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 254. 
 63 See generally HASKELL, supra note 6 (emphasizing the increased focus on 
interdependence and the need to study social conditions as a result); see also Rodgers, supra 
note 8, at 124 (describing the Progressive Era emphasis on social bonds). 
 64 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 65 See WILLRICH, supra note 21, at xxi–xxviii. 
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assumed to be in control of his actions, and the exercise of free will seemed 
more a fiction than a reality to reformers.66 Crime did not have one cause, 
nor did punishment have a single effect on the individual. Progressive Era 
reformers believed that the stress of the urban industrial world, harsh working 
conditions, and concentrated areas of poverty produced social ills.67 They 
also understood that punishing individuals could have negative consequences 
for the community, thereby causing an increase in the very problems they 
sought to alleviate.68 For example, with a typical Progressive Era emphasis 
on the effect of environment on crime, Jerome intervened in an assistant’s 
case to ask for a lenient sentence.69 A longshoreman was convicted for killing 
a man during a dockside brawl.70 Jerome argued that the judge should not 
impose a severe sentence because the crime was a result of the defendant’s 
poor upbringing, his lack of education, and the culture of street fighting.71 
Not all Progressive Era reformers viewed crime as the product of 
poverty, culture, and lack of education. For instance, Harry Olson—a chief 
prosecutor and judge in the late-nineteenth century—linked mental and 
emotional defects to crime.72 Many, like Olson, preferred sterilization and 
institutionalization to social programs.73 Olson oversaw the implementation 
of the “morals court,” designed to address public morality, including 
prostitution.74 Once again, he and others like him used voluntary 
associations, criminal sanctions, and expert treatment to address what was 
increasingly seen as a crisis in morality and a social pathology.75 
For the majority of Progressive Era criminal justice reformers, however, 
crime itself became a way to study the social pathologies of an industrial 
democratic state.76 The social explanation for crime, in turn, justified greater 
state involvement in the lives of working class Americans.77 Besides casting 
members of the working class as victims of poverty, prosecutors and 
reformers also blamed working class culture as a cause of criminality.78 
 
 66 Id. at xxi–xxii. 
 67 See id. at 83. 
 68 Id. at 66. 
 69 O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 120. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 WILLRICH, supra note 21, at 48. 
 73 Michael Willrich, The Two Percent Solution: Eugenic Jurisprudence and the 
Socialization of American Law, 1900–1930, 16 L. & HIST. REV. 63, 63–67 (1998). 
 74 WILLRICH, supra note 21, at 57. 
 75 Id. at 176-77. 
 76 Id. at xxiii. 
 77 Id. at xxvi. 
 78 Id. at 138. 
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Criminal justice reform in the Progressive Era served as one of the origins 
and early examples of the American welfare state. Reform prosecutors were 
not only interested in fighting corruption, they also sought to use the criminal 
law as a means of social control to reform individuals and enforce what they 
saw as American values in cities increasingly populated by immigrants.79 A 
specialized courtroom staff of social workers and psychiatrists was recruited 
to assist prosecutors in treating individuals and communities instead of 
simply punishing criminals. 
For instance, legislatures increasingly enacted deserter laws with 
criminal consequences for husbands who abandoned their families.80 
Taxpayers had not yet committed to sharing the burden for these individuals, 
and legislatures hoped to force wayward husbands to at least take a share of 
the responsibility. Charities and local government welfare agencies often 
required that a woman file a criminal complaint against her husband before 
collecting support. New family courts were established. These specialized 
courts employed social workers to assess the details of the relationship and 
determine whether a woman was worthy of help.81 Voluntary associations, 
charities, and government agencies worked alongside prosecutors in an 
attempt to solve the social problem of deserting husbands rather than merely 
punishing them.82 
It was not only the laws and mechanisms of government that drew 
prosecutors to help solve the social problems of the modern industrial state. 
Individuals also asked prosecutors to help discipline unruly children or 
punish delinquent husbands.83 Reformers argued that prisons were 
ineffective at deterring and rehabilitating individuals.84 Juvenile courts and 
 
 79 Id. at xxi-xxx. 
 80 For instance, Illinois made it a misdemeanor for a husband to abandon or neglect his 
wife and child: “[E]very person who shall, without good cause, abandon his wife and neglect 
and refuse to maintain and provide for her, or who shall abandon his or her minor child or 
children, under the age of twelve years, in destitute or necessitous circumstances, and willfully 
neglect or refuse to maintain and provide for such child or children, shall be deemed guilty of 
a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than one 
hundred dollars or more than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the County Jail, 
House of Correction or Workhouse not less than one month or more than twelve months, or 
by both such fine and imprisonment . . . .”  Act of May 13, 1903, 1903 Ill. Laws 155–56. 
 81 Michael Willrich, Home Slackers: Men, the State, and Welfare in Modern America, 87 
J. AM. HIST. 460, 481-82 (2000). 
 82 Id. at 460-61.  Overcriminalization was, at least in this one example, the result of trying 
to force a more powerful group to support a less powerful one and to use the criminal law to 
incentivize men to treat women properly. 
 83 WILLRICH, supra note 21, at 5. 
 84 Id. at 79. 
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the broad use of probation were tools prosecutors and judges used to avoid 
punishment but still address social ills.85 
The state expanded through its criminal laws to address the social 
problems of the urban industrial state. Progressive social thought emphasized 
both the interdependent nature of society as well as the critical role that 
experts and professionals play in understanding and addressing social 
problems. Thus, reformers sought to bring professionalism to the criminal 
justice system not only to rationalize it but also to calibrate it to address these 
problems rather than punish individuals, who were increasingly seen as the 
product of social conditions rather than lone instigators of bad acts. 
E. THE LEGACY OF PROSECUTORIAL PROFESSIONALISM 
The Progressive Era influenced criminal justice in various ways. One 
prominent legacy of the reformers is the cooperative, voluntary association 
between prosecutors, private organizations, and the state. Today, many cities 
have drug courts, family courts, and other specialized tribunals where 
prosecutors work with communities through social workers, mental health 
professionals, and others. But our focus here is on the reformers’ influence 
on the idea of the role and responsibilities of criminal prosecutors. 
The idea of public prosecution, exemplified by William Travers Jerome 
and others in the Progressive Era, was not wholly innovative. The 
professional ideal of prosecutors as quasi-judicial officials meting out even-
handed justice, without fear or favor, based on the evidence and a sense of 
proportionality, finds expression in nineteenth-century court opinions and 
other writings on the prosecutorial duty to seek justice.86 However, as 
illustrated by the New York County District Attorney’s office, into which 
Jerome stepped, early twentieth-century prosecutors often ignored—or at 
best paid lip service to—this ideal.87 Moreover, the professional ideal was 
itself underdeveloped. For example, Carolyn Ramsey’s history of nineteenth-
century prosecution suggests that even those who accepted the notion that 
prosecutors ought to be politically neutral did not necessarily agree that 
prosecutors, as representatives of the government, should serve the broader 
public interest as opposed to serving victims directly.88 Progressive Era 
prosecutors significantly advanced earlier professional norms, in part 
because of the sharpness and visibility of their break with their predecessors. 
 
 85 Id. at 66-68, 81-82. 
 86 Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice?”, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 
612-14 (1999). 
 87 See supra Part (I)(B). 
 88 Ramsey, supra note 46, at 1342-51. 
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The Progressive Era ideals of criminal prosecution included various 
related concepts—for example, that prosecutors do not take direction from, 
or serve the interests of, private parties; that prosecutors serve the public, not 
the parochial interests of their political parties or patrons; and that 
prosecutors pursue justice in a disinterested manner, exercising power based 
on the law and evidence, not personal whim. Later writings reiterated and 
expanded on these concepts. For example, in a much-quoted 1935 opinion, 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed that prosecutors represent “a sovereignty 
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to 
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not 
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”89 Then-Attorney 
General Robert Jackson further explained this concept in a 1940 published 
speech to federal prosecutors that is also cited often.90 In 1953, the U.S. 
Department of Justice began codifying its internal policies and practices in a 
manual for federal prosecutors to promote consistent enforcement of federal 
criminal law in accordance with accepted principles.91 In 1958, in an 
influential report on lawyers’ role in the adversarial process, Lon Fuller and 
John D. Randall emphasized that public prosecutors differ from lawyers with 
private clients in that they are “possessed . . . of important governmental 
powers that are pledged to the accomplishment of one objective only, that of 
impartial justice.”92 
A decade later, the American Bar Association published the first edition 
of the Prosecution Function Standards (now in its fourth edition), reflecting 
a professional consensus about how prosecutors should run their offices and 
exercise their authority.93 Since then, contemporary codifications of 
 
 89 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 90 Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3-6 
(1940) (explaining that federal prosecutors should be animated by “the spirit of fair play and 
decency,” “should have, as nearly as possible, a detached and impartial view of all groups in 
his community,” and is required “to select the cases for prosecution and to select those in 
which the offense is the most flagrant, the public harm the greatest, and the proof the most 
certain,” and that “[a]lthough the government technically loses its case, it has really won if 
justice has been done”).  On the enduring significance of Jackson’s speech, see generally 
Charles R. Wilson, “That Justice Shall Be Done”—Constitutional Requirements, Ethical 
Rules, and the Professional Ideal of Federal Prosecution, 36 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 111 (2015). 
 91 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, tit. 2 (1953), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/usam/1953/title2criminaldivision.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G4HR-69F2]. 
 92 Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint 
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1218 (1958). 
 93 See Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty Years of 
Excellence, 23 CRIM. JUST. 10, 10 (2009)); see generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR 
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
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professional conduct rules for the legal profession have referred to 
prosecutors’ responsibility to use their discretionary power fairly.94 These 
writings are a significant part of the framework for contemporary 
understandings of prosecutorial independence, neutrality, and detachment.95 
While it is hard to trace specific features of modern-day prosecution directly 
to the Progressive Era reform movement, most prosecutors, courts, and the 
public now accept certain Progressive Era ideals with little question. 
As the twentieth century progressed, professionalism and expertise 
supplanted political favoritism and cronyism in prosecutors’ offices. 
Although prosecutors still occasionally abuse their authority, and there is 
evidence that entire offices have a abandoned professional norms and 
processes,96 the outright corruption of public prosecutors’ offices—with 
lawyers who are either completely ineffective or in the pocket of politicians 
or wealthy business interests—is far more alien to us now than it was before 
the Progressive Era. 
For elected prosecutors, however, as the Progressive Era reform 
movement illustrated, there is a tension between populism and 
professionalism. William Travers Jerome rose to office on a wave of popular 
support for reform. He restored faith in criminal justice by implementing 
policies to treat defendants equally regardless of their wealth and status and 
personally advocating leniency for less fortunate criminals whose bad acts 
may have been influenced by their circumstances. Ultimately, however, his 
commitment to professionalism and refusal to interpret his campaign promise 
as a vow to unseat the powerful and pursue Wall Street and the moneyed 
trusts regardless of criminal conduct cost him his popular support. To a large 
extent, the mid- to late-twentieth-century prosecutors addressed the need to 
garner popular support by campaigning on their experience and expertise, not 
their policies. Once professionalism became an established qualification for 
office, prosecutors could turn their fidelity to professional expectations into 
a selling point, thus depoliticizing prosecutors’ offices. Of course, 
 
 94 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); MODEL CODE 
OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). 
 95 See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution, 69 AM. U. 
L. REV. 805, 844-46 (2020) (identifying prosecutors’ skill and expertise as a justification for 
their independence) [hereinafter Green & Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution]; Bruce 
A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the Department of Justice?, 70 ALA. 
L. REV. 1, 60-74 (2018) (discussing the history of federal prosecutors’ independence and 
nonpartisanship and the underlying policy reasons) [hereinafter Green & Roiphe, Can the 
President Control the Department of Justice?]. 
 96 For example, in many cases, prosecutors have been indifferent to discovery obligations.  
See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 70-72 (2011) (declining to hold a prosecutors’ 
office liable for one Brady violation even when the office failed to provide adequate training). 
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contemporary prosecutors’ commitment to strict enforcement of the criminal 
law, which could be characterized as a professional value, also aligned with 
popular sentiment until recent years. 
II.  TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY “PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTORS” 
Against the background of popular unease with the criminal process, 
today’s progressive prosecutors have offered an alternative to mainstream 
prosecutors, just as Progressive Era prosecutors offered an alternative to 
those exercising prosecutorial power in their day. Of course, the twenty-first-
century progressive prosecutors probably have not been looking for 
inspiration in the endeavors of their Progressive Era predecessors. However, 
as the following discussion shows, parallels may be drawn. 
Although the Progressive Era prosecutors may have had prior 
prosecutorial experience, they ran for election as outsiders with significant 
popular support, opposed to the conventional way of running prosecutors’ 
offices as marked by favoritism, cronyism, and incompetence. Today’s 
progressive prosecutors have different—and less stark—complaints about 
the status quo given improvements during the past century in law and society, 
but they also run on a promise of change. Like the earlier Progressive Era 
prosecutors, today’s progressive prosecutors advance ideas for reform that 
take account of the broader socio-economic context in which criminal 
conduct occurs and cases are prosecuted. They do not simply process cases 
but seek to change criminal laws, institutions, and procedure. In opposing the 
status quo and the political establishment responsible for it, today’s 
progressive prosecutors—like the Progressive Era reformers—have sought 
office by appealing directly to the people by promising to protect the poor 
and to bring the rich and powerful to justice. Consequently, today’s 
progressive prosecutors, like their Progressive Era predecessors, have faced 
considerable backlash from the political establishment. 
This Part begins in Section A by offering a short review of relevant 
developments in criminal justice during the past fifty years. Section B then 
describes the contemporary progressive prosecution movement. Section C 
focuses particularly on progressive prosecutors’ approach to the exercise of 
discretion and how their approach differs from that of today’s mainstream 
prosecutors, whose ideas of professionalism are a legacy of the Progressive 
Era. Notwithstanding differences in approach that may look significant from 
a contemporary perspective, today’s mainstream and progressive prosecutors 
share fundamental understandings that, from a historical perspective, 
probably make them more alike than different. Sections B and C each draw 
parallels to the earlier Progressive Era movement. 
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A. FRAMING THE NEW PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION MOVEMENT 
Historians of twentieth-century criminal justice in America have 
documented an increasingly punitive system. Beginning in the 1970s, 
politicians responded to the increases in the national crime rate to promote a 
more aggressive approach to crime.97 Since then, the country has witnessed 
an increase in the rate of incarceration, disproportionately affecting African-
American men and other minorities.98 In many, if not all, of these accounts, 
prosecutorial discretion played a dominant role in these trends.99 
As the country witnessed these changes, there was a historical turn 
against experts and professionals from both the left and the right.100 Scholars, 
the popular press, and others questioned the Progressive Era assumption that 
experts and professionals would seek truth and transcend political or personal 
interest. Skeptics argued that professionals are all political actors, subject to 
bias,101 and all have their own professional self-interest driving their 
decisions.102 
In the political arena, the innocence movement, #MeToo, and Black 
Lives Matter have popularized some critical aspects of criminal justice.103 
The innocence movement has exposed the fact that some defendants serving 
long sentences are not guilty. This movement simultaneously demonstrated 
that prosecutors abuse their discretion at times, contributing to this 
injustice.104 The #MeToo movement focused public attention on inequality 
 
 97 See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 216 (2011). 
 98 ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING 
OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 5 (2016); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE 
LAW 21-22 (1997). 
 99 JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO 
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 206 (2017); Angela J. Davis, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to End 
Mass Incarceration, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1070-78 (2016). 
 100 Rebecca Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 649, 
665-68 (2016). 
 101 Id. at 666. 
 102 Id.; see also Dana A. Remus, Reconstructing Professionalism, 51 GA. L. REV. 807, 
811-14 (2017) (arguing that the neo-liberal notion of lawyers as market actors neglects the 
ways in which the professional form contributes significant value to society). 
 103 Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 87-93; Lara Bazelon & Aya Gruber, #MeToo 
Doesn’t Always Have to Mean Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/03/02/opinion/metoo-doesnt-always-have-to-mean-prison.html 
[https://perma.cc/DK86-H5XU]. 
 104 Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Contribution to Wrongful Convictions, in 
EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 109, 114-118 
(Allison D. Redlich, James R. Acker, Robert J. Norris & Catherine L. Bonventre, eds., 2014); 
New Report: Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Aug. 
25, 2010), https://www.innocenceproject.org/new-report-prosecutorial-misconduct-and-wron
gful-convictions/ [https://perma.cc/22QC-QCLX]. 
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in the criminal justice system by protesting the under-enforcement of rape 
and sexual assault, particularly by wealthy white men. Finally, Black Lives 
Matter drew attention to the unequal and often dehumanizing treatment of 
black men by law enforcement. 
Thus, the contemporary progressive prosecution movement comes on 
the heels of concerns about mass incarceration, an increasing distrust of 
professionals and experts of all sorts, and a political focus on inequality in 
the criminal justice system. The movement is also accompanied by a growing 
chorus of scholars who believe the solution to criminal justice problems is 
handing over control to local communities.105 
B. THE RISE OF THE NEW PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION MOVEMENT 
By late 2019, a number of elected prosecutors across the United States 
came to be known as “progressive prosecutors.”106 These included 
prosecutors elected in Boston, Brooklyn, Kansas City, Philadelphia, and San 
Francisco.107 But not all were from the North or from big cities. So-called 
progressive prosecutors have been elected in Dallas, Houston, Orlando, San 
Antonio and localities in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia, among other 
places.108 In general, beginning in 2015, their campaigns have been funded 
 
 105 See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 129–65 (2012); Josh 
Bowers, Upside-Down Juries, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1655, 1666-67 (2017); Joshua Kleinfeld, 
Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367, 1397–1401 (2017); 
Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Though Contestation and Resistance, 111 
NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1622–23 (2017).  For a critique of this solution, see John Rappaport, 
Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 739–809 
(2020). 
 106 Berman, supra note 1. 
 107 See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, Defending Progressive Prosecution, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 4) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c
fm?abstract_id=3479165) [https://perma.cc/J4EY-4VZC] (identifying Larry Krasner 
(Philadelphia), Kim Foxx (Chicago), Marilyn Mosby (Baltimore), Rachael Rollins (Boston), 
Chesa Boudin (San Francisco), and John Creuzot (Dallas)); Emily Bazelon & Miriam Krinsky, 
There’s a Wave of New Prosecutors. And They Mean Justice., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/opinion/how-local-prosecutors-can-reform-their-
justice-systems.html [https://perma.cc/Y56Z-DNU6] (identifying Mark Dupree (Kansas City) 
and others as “new, progressive prosecutors”); Sam Resiman, The Rise of the Progressive 
Prosecutor, LAW360 (Apr. 7, 2019, 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1145615/the-
rise-of-the-progressive-prosecutor [https://perma.cc/68SN-TSS7] (identifying Wesley Bell 
(St. Louis), Rachael Rollins (Boston), and Larry Krasner (Philadelphia) as “part of a new wave 
of progressive prosecutors”). 
 108 Bellin, supra note 107; Angela J. Davis, Reimagining Prosecution: A Growing 
Progressive Movement, 3 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 1, 18, 23 (2019) (identifying Aramis 
Ayala (Orlando), Scott Colom (Mississippi), and others as progressive prosecutors); Bazelon 
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by a consortium led by George Soros, as part of a broader criminal justice 
reform effort.109 
It is not entirely clear when these twenty-first-century prosecutors were 
first labeled as progressives, or when the label became popular. It is certainly 
not meant as a reference to Progressive Era prosecutors. Prior to 2015, the 
term “progressive” was used conceptually to characterize liberal, reform-
oriented prosecutors.110 Since then, it has come to be used to describe an 
identifiable group of elected prosecutors. A 2015 interview with Kim Foxx 
before her election in Chicago referred to two of the first Soros-backed 
prosecutors—Scott Colom of Mississippi and James Stewart of Caddo 
Parish, Louisiana—as “progressive prosecutors.”111 In a 2017 article, David 
Sklansky offered ten “‘best practices’ for . . . progressive district 
 
& Krinsky, supra note 107 (stating the progressive prosecutors were elected in five Texas 
cities, including Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio); Virginia’s Newly Elected Progressive 
Prosecutors, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, https://www.americanprogress.org/events/2019/12/10
/478594/virginias-newly-elected-progressive-prosecutors/ [https://perma.cc/7Z93-7NUM] 
(identifying newly-elected prosecutors of Arlington, Fairfax, and Loudoun Counties); Alex 
Yablon, The Suburbs Aren’t Scared of Criminal Justice Reform, SLATE (Feb. 7, 2010, 5:18 
PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/02/virginia-suburbs-progressive-prosecutors.h
tml [https://perma.cc/P5CZ-856H] (“In 2019, progressive prosecutors swept Democratic 
primary and general elections in the prosperous suburbs of northern Virginia: Fairfax, 
Loudoun, and Prince William counties as well as the city of Arlington.”); see also infra note 
130 and accompanying text. 
 109 See EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN 
PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION 79, 83 (2019); Scott Bland, George Soros’ 
Quiet Overhaul of the U.S. Justice System, POLITICO (Aug. 30, 2016, 5:25 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/george-soros-criminal-justice-reform-227519 
[https://perma.cc/JW3U-CSPL] (discussing Soros’s support for “district attorney campaigns 
in Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico and Texas”); Paige St. John & Abbie 
VanSickle, Here’s Why George Soros, Liberal Groups Are Spending Big to Help Decide 
Who’s Your Next D.A., L.A. TIMES (May 23, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-prosecutor-campaign-20180523-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/ED2V-6WYP] (discussing Soros’s support for district attorney campaigns 
in California). 
 110 Before then the term was not used to describe an identifiable group of elected 
prosecutors, but to describe subordinate or chief prosecutors who were out-of-step with 
mainstream, tough-on-crime prosecutors in that they supported liberal criminal justice policies 
or practices.  PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 114–19 (2009) 
(asking “what happens to progressive prosecutors?” and explaining that “[p]eople who go into 
prosecution with a progressive agenda get derailed”); Bruce A. Green, Gideon’s Amici: Why 
Do Prosecutors So Rarely Defend the Rights of the Accused?, 122 YALE L.J. 2336, 2356 
(2013) (“Progressive prosecutors could establish their own association to advance their 
perspectives.”). 
 111 Leon Neyfakh, Why Did It Take More Than a Year to Charge the Officer Who Shot 
Laquan McDonald?, SLATE (Nov. 25, 2015, 4:41 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2
015/11/laquan-mcdonald-kim-foxx-on-why-anita-alvarez-mishandled-the-jason-van-dyke-
case.html [https://perma.cc/2PJ4-WSUM]. 
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attorneys.”112 In her 2019 book on the prosecution reform movement, Emily 
Bazelon described the victors as “[r]eform-minded prosecutors,”113 but 
others described these nontraditional elected prosecutors and their like-
minded colleagues as “progressive prosecutors.”114 The label stuck, although 
some prosecutors in the group might not claim to be “progressive” and 
others’ claims might be contested.115 
There is not complete agreement on what distinguishes progressive 
prosecutors from their mainstream contemporaries.116 Jeffrey Bellin 
distinguishes progressive prosecutors from “traditional by-the-book 
prosecutor[s],” in how progressive prosecutors employ the power of 
“prosecutorial lenience” to “serve as a check on the [criminal justice] 
system’s severity by counteracting overly-punitive police, legislatures, 
judges, and juries . . . .”117 This, however, is not necessarily as sharp of a 
break with the status quo as progressive prosecutors suggest on the campaign 
trail. Bellin notes that mainstream prosecutors customarily decline to 
prosecute some minor offenders in order to conserve resources. He argues 
that when progressive prosecutors adopt controversial policies to decline to 
prosecute “[m]inor crimes that are extremely common, like drug possession, 
trespassing, and loitering . . . apart from the rhetoric surrounding those 
decisions, the distinction is one of degree rather than kind.”118 Bellin also 
observes that, rhetorically, progressive prosecutors adopt a “‘populist justice’ 
approach that attempts to mold discretionary decisions to accord with 
 
 112 David Alan Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 UC DAVIS L. REV. 
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 114 Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution,” 132 HARV. L. REV. 748, 750–51 
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 115 See David Alan Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for Elected Prosecutors, 
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prosecutor ‘progressive’”); see also Zach Despart & Samantha Ketterer, Saying Ogg Not 
Progressive Enough, TOP Endorses Dem Challenger Audia Jones, HOUS. CHRONICLE (Jan. 
20, 2020, 8:12 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/
Saying-Ogg-not-progressive-enough-TOP-endorses-14990286.php [https://perma.cc/UX2N-
6S7Q]. 
 116 See Benjamin Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor, MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3542792) [https://perma.cc/X4SY-F6GP]; Sklansky, supra note 115, at 667 (observing that 
“[t]he prosecutors who have won election on ‘progressive’ platforms are an eclectic group”). 
 117 Bellin, supra note 107, at 26; see also Carissa Byrne Hessick & Michael Morse, 
Picking Prosecutors, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1537, 1541 (2020)  (“[Using] the term to refer to 
prosecutors who have specifically championed or adopted prosecutorial practices that are 
intended to make the criminal justice system less punitive.”). 
 118 Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1203, 1249–50 (2020). 
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constituent preferences.”119 While the same might previously have been said 
about “tough on crime” prosecutors, we, too, identify a closer link between 
progressive prosecutors and their political base. 
Other journalists and scholars emphasize progressive prosecutors’ 
campaign platforms and published policies, particularly insofar as they are 
meant to redress over-incarceration and racial bias in the criminal process. 
These include internal policies on when and how to use prosecutorial power. 
Progressive prosecutors might be distinguished from traditional “tough-on-
crime” prosecutors in that their campaign platforms have “included 
abandoning cash bail, declining low-level charges, not pursuing marijuana 
cases and closely scrutinizing police conduct, in efforts to reform a system 
that they say over-incarcerates and disproportionately punishes poor people 
and racial minorities.”120 
Like Progressive Era prosecutors, today’s progressive prosecutors are 
situated in a broader reform movement. Bellin underscores progressive 
prosecutors’ efforts “to leverage prosecutorial power to achieve criminal 
justice reform.”121 But progressive prosecutors also support legislative 
reform of aspects of the criminal justice system over which they have no 
immediate control.122 Many of the prosecutorial practices and legislative 
policies associated with progressive prosecutors can be found in a 2018 
report, “21 Principles for the 21st Century Prosecutor,”123 designed to 
advance the movement and give it coherence. 
Today’s progressive prosecutors may be regarded as successors to 
liberal and reform-minded predecessors of a few years earlier such as Craig 
Watkins, the Dallas prosecutor who established one of the most prominent 
conviction integrity units out of concern for the fairness and reliability of 
 
 119 Id. at 1218. 
 120 Berman, supra note 1. 
 121 Bellin, supra note 118, at 1206; see also Daniel Nichanian, The Politics of Prosecutors, 
APPEAL, https://theappeal.org/political-report/the-politics-of-prosecutors/ [https://perma.cc/V
K4Q-F7RV] (tracking developments in the prosecutorial reform movement). 
 122 See Note, supra note 114, at 750 (identifying platforms on decriminalizing marijuana 
and the repeal of mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses). 
 123 FAIR AND JUST PROSECUTION, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. & THE JUST. COLLABORATIVE, 
21 PRINCIPLES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY PROSECUTOR (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/publications/FJP_21Principles_FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SSL6-TYNN]. For additional issue statements from Fair and Just 
Prosecution, see FAIR AND JUST PROSECUTION, https://fairandjustprosecution.org/ [https://per
ma.cc/HQ2T-Z2U9]. 
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death-row defendants’ convictions,124 Milwaukee prosecutor John Chisholm, 
who was lauded in 2015 for his efforts to reduce the rate of incarceration,125 
and others.126 But the progressive prosecutors are distinguished from their 
predecessors in part by their numbers, their visibility, and their transparency 
about their exercise of discretion. Some earlier prosecutors proceeded 
experimentally by, for example, promoting diversion programs and other 
rehabilitative measures, especially for low-level offenders.127 But these were 
typically prosecutors who ran unopposed or faced no serious opposition and 
who did not campaign on their innovative efforts. 
Both Progressive Era prosecutors and today’s progressive prosecutors 
come from outside the political establishment. Today’s progressive 
prosecutors are also distinguished from mainstream prosecutors by their 
identity, which adds to their outsider status. A large proportion of progressive 
prosecutors are African-American,128 women,129 or both. Many have little or 
no prosecutorial experience, instead previously serving as criminal defense 
or civil rights lawyers.130 Notably, progressive prosecutors have banded 
 
 124 See Barry Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We Need 
Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating Them, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215, 2250 
(2010) (identifying Watkins’ Conviction Integrity Unit as “[t]he most prominent and 
successful model”). 
 125 See Jeffrey Toobin, The Milwaukee Experiment, NEW YORKER (May 14, 2015), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/11/the-milwaukee-experiment 
[https://perma.cc/H5WR-SJCK]. 
 126 See, e.g., BAZELON, supra note 109, at 80 (“The partial exceptions to harsh law-and-
order prosecution, over the last generation, were a few cities like Seattle and Milwaukee with 
long-serving D.A.s who emphasized drug treatment and rehabilitation rather than locking 
people up and throwing away the key.”). 
 127 Id.; ABA COMMISSION ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, SECOND CHANCES IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION AND REENTRY STRATEGIES 13 
(2007), http://www.rashkind.com/alternatives/dir_01/saltzburg_ABA%20report.pdf[https://p
erma.cc/D4KZ-AX8G] (discussing programs supported by elected prosecutors in Brooklyn 
(New York), Multnomah County (Oregon), and elsewhere). 
 128 See, e.g., Eli Hager & Nicole Lewis, Facing Intimidation, Black Women Prosecutors 
Say: “Enough,” MARSHALL PROJECT (Jan. 16, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://www.the
marshallproject.org/2020/01/16/facing-intimidation-black-women-prosecutors-say-enough 
[https://perma.cc/Q3JR-FCTU] (discussing challenges to progressive prosecutors who are 
black women, including Kimberly Gardner (St. Louis), Aramis Ayala (Orlando), Kim Foxx 
(Chicago), Rachael Rollins (Boston), and Marilyn Mosby (Baltimore)). 
 129 See id. 
 130 Several of the progressive prosecutors have replaced subordinates at a notably high 
rate. See, e.g., Chris Palmer, Julie Shaw & Mensah M. Dean, Krasner Dismisses 31 From 
Philly DA’s Office in Dramatic First-Week Shakeup, PHIL. INQUIRER (Jan. 5, 2018, 12:29 PM), 
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/crime/larry-krasner-philly-da-firing-prosecutors-201
80105.html-2 [https://perma.cc/AYR5-KLD4]; Brian Rogers, Shake-Up at the Courthouse: 
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together—or been brought together—both to share their experiences and to 
provide mutual support.131 Although other elected prosecutors belong to the 
National District Attorney’s Association or to state prosecutors’ associations, 
these other prosecutors have less in common with each other and benefit less 
from mutual exchange. 
Having called attention to themselves and to how they differ from their 
campaign opponents or from other traditional prosecutors, progressive 
prosecutors have been closely scrutinized.132 Some left-wing critics of the 
criminal process have been heartened by their election133—but not all.134 At 
the same time, progressive prosecutors have also become a lightning rod for 
criticism from the right.135 In late 2019, U.S. Attorney General William Barr 
sharply attacked progressive prosecutors collectively in a speech to the 
Fraternal Order of Police.136 Progressive prosecutors have also been attacked 
 
Incoming DA Ogg Hands Pink Slips to 37 Top Prosecutors, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 16, 2016, 
9:12 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Shake-up-
at-the-courthouse-Incoming-DA-Ogg-hands-10802264.php [https://perma.cc/D6CG-Q6RY]. 
 131 See, e.g., Hager & Lewis, supra note 128 (noting that progressive black women 
prosecutors came to a rally in St. Louis to support Kimberly Gardner).  Progressive 
prosecutors were chief among the signatories to a letter responding to Attorney General Barr’s 
attack.  See, e.g., Statement, Fair & Just Prosecution, Statement in Response to Attorney 
General Barr’s Remarks to the Fraternal Order of Police (Aug. 16, 2019), 
https://assets.law360news.com/1189000/1189627/barr-remarks-sign-on-statement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CAA6-KYXS].  Progressive prosecutors also joined an amicus brief 
defending St. Louis prosecutor Kimberly Gardner’s efforts to secure the release of an allegedly 
wrongly convicted incarceree, Lamar Johnson.  Brief of Amici Curiae 43 Prosecutors in 
Support of the State’s Motion for New Trial, State v. Johnson, No. 22941-03706A-01 (Mo. 
Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019). 
 132 For example, there has been considerable debate over progressive prosecutors’ policies 
to decline prosecuting certain low-level offenses.  See, e.g., John E. Foster, Note, Charges to 
be Declined: Legal Challenges and Policy Debates Surrounding Non-Prosecution Initiatives 
in Massachusetts, 60 B.C.L. REV. 2511, 2530 (2019); James M. Doyle, Why Rachael Rollins 
Makes Boston’s ‘Courthouse Regulars’ Nervous, CRIME REP. (July 15, 2019), https://thecr
imereport.org/2019/07/15/why-rachel-rollins-unnerves-bostons-justice-establishment/ 
[https://perma.cc/4DPD-BKCL]. 
 133 See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The Progressive Prosecutor: An Imperative for Criminal 
Justice Reform, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. ONLINE 1, 3–5 (2018), https://fordhamlawreview.org/
wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Davis-BP.pdf [https://perma.cc/7M22-XLEU]. 
 134 See, e.g., Note, supra note 114, at 760–68 (discussing “the inadequacies of progressive 
prosecution against the rubric of transformative reforms”). 
 135 See Davis, supra note 108, at 15 (discussing challenges to progressive prosecutors 
from subordinates and from others outside their offices). 
 136 William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Grand Lodge Fraternal Order of Police’s 
64th National Biennial Conference (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-grand-lodge-fraternal-order-
polices-64th [https://perma.cc/Z8VQ-GH46] (maintaining that prosecutors who “style 
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individually. For example, President Trump accused Philadelphia’s Larry 
Krasner of “let[ting] killers out almost immediately,”137 and the local U.S. 
Attorney blamed the shooting of six police officers on “a new culture of 
disrespect for law enforcement” created by Krasner.138 Some progressive 
prosecutors have become embroiled in formal disputes with other public 
officials. For example, after Orlando’s Aramis Ayala announced a policy to 
decline to seek the death penalty, the state’s governor removed her authority 
over capital cases.139 The Pennsylvania legislature authorized the state 
Attorney General to initiate firearms charges in Philadelphia, so that the local 
police can ask the Attorney General to bring charges that Krasner declines.140 
St. Louis’s Kimberly Gardner has clashed with the state’s Attorney General 
over her authority to remedy her predecessor’s conviction of an innocent 
defendant,141 and she has filed a federal lawsuit against the city, its police 
officers’ association, and others, accusing them of engaging in a racist 
 
themselves as ‘social justice’ reformers” are “demoralizing to law enforcement and dangerous 
to public safety” because they have “refus[ed] to enforce broad swathes of the criminal 
law . . . [a]nd when they do deign to charge a criminal suspect, they are frequently seeking 
sentences that are pathetically lenient”).  Barr later announced his intention to scrutinize local 
prosecutors whom he accused of “charging foreign nationals with lesser offenses for the 
express purpose of avoiding the federal immigration consequences.”  Sarah N. Lynch & 
Makini Brice, U.S. Justice Department Files New Lawsuits in Renewed Push to Pressure 
‘Sanctuary Cities’, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2020, 4:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-justice-immigration/us-justice-department-files-new-lawsuits-in-renewed-push-to-
pressure-sanctuary-cities-idUSKBN2042JW [https://perma.cc/7XYW-6ER9]. 
 137 Virginia Streva, Trump Calls Philly’s Krasner ‘the Worst District Attorney’ During 
Rally in Hershey, PHILLYVOICE (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.phillyvoice.com/donald-trump-
philadelphia-district-larry-krasner-worst-rally-hershey/ [https://perma.cc/D26V-XXMV]. 
 138 Bobby Allyn, U.S. Attorney Slams Philadelphia DA over ‘Culture of Disrespect for 
Law Enforcement,’ NPR (Aug. 17, 2019, 4:26 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/17/7520
51788/u-s-attorney-slams-philadelphia-da-over-culture-of-disrespect-for-law-enforcemen 
[https://perma.cc/Q38P-NJ57]; Statement by United States Attorney William M. McSwain on 
the Shooting of Six Philadelphia Police Officers (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usa
o-edpa/pr/statement-united-states-attorney-william-m-mcswain-shooting-six-philadelphia-
police [https://perma.cc/KN6P-J5MN]. 
 139 Ayala v. Scott, 224 So. 3d 755, 759–60 (Fla. 2017). 
 140 Akela Lacy & Ryan Grim, Pennsylvania Lawmakers Move to Strip Reformist 
Prosecutor Larry Krasner of Authority, INTERCEPT (July 8, 2019, 4:55 PM), 
https://theintercept.com/2019/07/08/da-larry-krasner-pennsylvania-attorney-general/ 
[https://perma.cc/UNX3-BHB5]. 
 141 Richard A. Oppel Jr., 30 Prosecutors Say Lamar Johnson Deserves a New Trial. Why 
Won’t He Get One?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/25/us/c
riminal-justice-missouri-conviction.html [https://perma.cc/RDV9-K4VY] (discussing State v. 
Johnson, No. ED108193, 2019 WL 7157665 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2019)). 
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conspiracy which has included securing a special prosecutor to investigate 
her office.142 
One of the most high-profile controversies arose out of the Chicago 
indictment of Jussie Smollett, a well-known black actor, for staging his own 
attack and pretending that it was a race-based hate crime.143 The State’s 
Attorney’s Office, run by Kimberly Foxx, subsequently dropped all sixteen 
charges against him, accepting the $10,000 bond in exchange.144 Ordinarily, 
a state prosecutor would either dismiss charges entirely, enter into a plea 
bargain, or in some circumstances defer prosecution with an understanding 
that charges will be dismissed if no further wrongs are committed. Although 
it has become common in corporate criminal cases for the federal government 
to receive a monetary payment as part of a non-prosecution agreement,145 it 
is unusual for state or local prosecutors to accept money (other than 
restitution) from an individual in exchange for declining to bring criminal 
charges. Meanwhile, Foxx stated that she was personally recusing herself 
from the case because she had discussed it with some interested parties.146 
But, rejecting the advice of an adviser in her office, she did not follow the 
normal recusal procedure in which the court would be asked to appoint a 
special prosecutor from outside the office, and instead she delegated 
prosecution decisions to a subordinate.147 Later, Foxx’s office asserted that 
the resolution of the Smollett case was in keeping with its policy regarding 
non-violent offenses.148 There may well have been no impropriety, but 
Foxx’s failure to follow the norms and practices of the office invited critics, 
including her political opponents, to speculate that this result was improperly 
motivated.149 
 
 142 Complaint at 2–3, 28, Gardner v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:20-cv-00060 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 
13, 2020). 
 143 See Order at 2–4, In re Appointment of Special Prosecutor, No. 19 MR 00014 (Ill. Cir. 
Ct. June 21, 2019). 
 144 Id. at 4–5. 
 145 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Defense Contractor Agrees to Pay $45 
Million to Resolve Criminal Obstruction Charges and Civil False Claims Act Allegations 
(Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/defense-contractor-agrees-pay-45-million-
resolve-criminal-obstruction-charges-and-civil-false [https://perma.cc/3626-3YH5]; Brandon 
L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1810 (2011) (presenting 
data regarding fines paid by corporations resolving criminal cases with the Department of 
Justice). 
 146 In re Appointment of Special Prosecutor, Order at 6–7. 
 147 Id. at 6–7, 14–16. 
 148 German Lopez, Trump: FBI and Justice Department Will Review the Jussie Smollett 
Case, VOX (Mar. 28, 2019, 10:35 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/3/28/
18285310/jussie-smollett-trump-fbi-justice-department [https://perma.cc/6DRV-27X3]. 
 149 See id. 
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Progressive prosecutors do not espouse identical sets of policies and 
practices. Nor for that matter do mainstream prosecutors—not all mainstream 
prosecutors are “tough on crime.”150 In liberal jurisdictions, many candidates 
have opposed incumbents or career prosecutors who themselves endorsed 
policies and practices associated with the progressive prosecution 
movement.151 Nevertheless, progressive prosecutors plainly differ in general 
from most of their contemporaries in ways that seem evident, if not easily 
encapsulated. And in notable respects, their differences have parallels to the 
experience of Progressive Era reformers, who were also outsiders who 
challenged the political establishment based on a different conception of how 
prosecutors’ offices—and the criminal process in general—should function. 
In Section C, we turn to the question Bellin posed of whether the difference 
is one of degree or kind. 
C. COMPARING PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTORS TO THEIR PROGRESSIVE 
ERA PREDECESSORS 
This Section examines whether contemporary progressive prosecutors 
are distinctive from the Progressive Era tradition and from contemporary 
notions of prosecutorial professionalism that arose out of it. Our focus is on 
progressive prosecutors’ exercise of discretion. In particular, we examine 
progressive prosecutors’ controversial policies to refrain from prosecuting 
 
 150 For example, Manhattan prosecutor Cyrus Vance, Jr., undertook initiatives later 
associated with progressive prosecution, such as creating a conviction integrity unit; ending 
the prosecution of violations, infractions, and certain misdemeanors where the individual 
poses no risk to public safety; and pursuing alternatives to incarceration.  See MANHATTAN 
DIST. ATT’Y’S OFFICE, MODELS FOR INNOVATION: THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S 
OFFICE 2010–2018 9, 13, 16 (2018), https://www.https://www.manhattanda.org/wp-content
/uploads/2018/03/Models-For-Innovation-Report-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5SA-D5C5]. 
 151 For instance, Cyrus Vance, Jr., the District Attorney of New York County, was 
described in 2017 as “considered one of America’s most progressive prosecutors.”  Josie 
Duffy Rice, Cyrus Vance and the Myth of the Progressive Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/opinion/cy-vance-progressive-prosecutor.html 
[https://perma.cc/5DG9-4QN8].  Vance himself has claimed credit for “enact[ing] numerous 
progressive initiatives and reforms that reduce unnecessary incarceration and end the criminal 
prosecution of thousands of low-level, nonviolent offenses annually.”  Cy Vance for DA, 
CYRUS VANCE FOR MANHATTAN DIST. ATT’Y, http://www.cyvanceforda.com/page/criminal-
justice-reform [https://perma.cc/ZSE7-6QBC].  Nevertheless, as of June 2020, a year before 
the next election and before Vance had announced whether he would step down, he faced five 
progressive challengers for the Democratic party nomination.  See Jeff Colton, Challengers 
Blast Vance’s Push to Jail Looters, CITY & ST. N. Y. (June 9, 2020), https://www.cityandstat
eny.com/articles/politics/new-york-city/challengers-blast-vances-push-jail-looters.html 
[https://perma.cc/3W95-4MU4] (“Tahanie Aboushi, Alvin Bragg, Janos Marton, Eliza Orlins 
and Assemblyman Dan Quart . . . are all are running as progressive candidates in the 2021 
Democratic primary for Manhattan district attorney.”). 
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certain low-level offenses and to divert certain offenders, particularly non-
violent offenders, out of the conventional criminal process and into 
rehabilitative services. 
1. The Politics of Criminal Justice Reform 
Both Progressive Era prosecutors and contemporary progressive 
prosecutors shared broad popular support and the avid attention of local and 
national voters. While Progressive Era reform was complex, it included a 
faith in expertise, professionalism, and efficiency, and a focus on curing the 
social ills that accompanied urban industrial capitalism. Contemporary 
progressive prosecutors share some of the same concerns about society and, 
like Progressive Era reformers, believe that the internal processes and 
organization of prosecutors’ offices need reform. At times, it seems as if 
progressive prosecutors are skeptical about the value of prosecutorial 
professionalism that we have identified as a legacy of the Progressive Era.152 
But at other times, it seems that progressive prosecutors simply take a 
different view of how to implement conventional professional values. 
Progressive Era prosecutors and criminal justice reformers invoked 
populist political rhetoric in their campaign speeches,153 promising to address 
corruption within prosecutors’ offices and the courts themselves.154 While 
professionalism was always the main focus of the movement, there was also 
a promise to root out corruption and hold powerful political bosses 
accountable for their misdeeds. Contemporary progressive prosecutors 
similarly appeal to and draw on a popular political movement. But unlike 
candidates who ran as reformers in the Progressive Era, today’s progressive 
prosecutors aim to root out bias rather than political influence and corruption. 
Consequently, their method focuses less on reforming internal decision-
making processes than on altering substantive priorities that bear on the 
exercise of discretion.155 Perhaps the new progressive prosecutors simply 
take professionalism for granted, but it is at least worth noting a possible 
tension between their populist rhetoric and the idea of professionalism with 
its focus on processes rather than outcomes. 
Today’s would-be progressive prosecutors’ campaign platforms address 
not only considerations of criminal justice policy, but also broader 
 
 152 See supra Part I(D) (highlighting Progressive Era prosecutors’ legacy of 
professionalism). 
 153 See, e.g., O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 77–81 (describing William Travers Jerome’s 
populist campaign oratory). 
 154 See generally TRAIN, supra note 7 (cataloguing the anti-corruption effort). See also 
WILLRICH, supra note 21, at 23. 
 155 See infra Parts II(C)(2) & II(C)(3). 
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considerations of social policy, such as racial justice and over-
incarceration.156 Likewise, Progressive Era prosecutors, while focusing on 
fairness and the evenhanded application of law to fact, also addressed the 
treatment of offenders and the social nature of crime. Their objective was not 
only to reduce criminal activity in urban communities, but also to deal with 
broader social problems.157 By campaigning on their discretionary charging 
policies, however, today’s progressive prosecutors seem more directly 
responsive to popular race-based and class-based sentiment. They discuss 
their discretionary decision-making on the campaign trail, expressly tying 
their proposed policies regarding prosecutorial discretion to the social and 
political concerns of the day. In contrast, although seeking popular support 
by opposing establishment candidates, the Progressive Era prosecutors were 
wary of popular control over prosecution decisions, recognizing that the 
pursuit of popular support could distract them from their core mission of 
ensuring that those who can be proved guilty are adequately punished and 
others are not. 
In campaigning on issues of prosecutorial discretion, progressive 
prosecutors seem especially different from the many mainstream prosecutors 
who have had the luxury of running for office unopposed or without serious 
opposition.158 But even mainstream prosecutors facing serious opposition 
have typically campaigned on their experience and expertise, not on their 
policies.159 In doing so, mainstream prosecutors convey that they are at least 
nonpartisan, if not apolitical.160 Much like judges who picture themselves as 
 
 156 See, e.g., Tiffany’s Commitments, CABÁN FOR QUEENS DIST. ATT’Y, 
https://www.cabanforqueens.com/issues/ [https://perma.cc/AR9U-MYYP] (website of 
Tiffany Cabán promising to “End Racist Law Enforcement” and “End Mass Incarceration in 
Queens”).  Cabán failed to secure the Democratic Party’s nomination for District Attorney of 
Queens County, New York.  Associated Press, Tiffany Cabán Concedes Defeat in Contested 
Queens DA Race, NBC NEWS (Aug. 6, 2019, 10:22 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
politics/elections/tiffany-cab-n-concedes-defeat-contested-queens-da-race-n1039841 
[https://perma.cc/RB2M-EQX6]. 
 157 See supra Part I(C). 
 158 See Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 
592–97 (2009) (finding that incumbent prosecutors seeking reelection rarely have 
challengers); see also Hessick & Morse, supra note 117, at 1545 (finding that, particularly in 
rural counties, prosecutorial elections are often uncontested, not only when an incumbent 
seeks reelection but also when the office is open). 
 159 Wright, supra note 158, at 600–02 (finding that prosecutors campaigning for reelection 
“talked about character and individual experiences far more often than they discussed the 
performance of the office as a whole”). 
 160 In some jurisdictions, elections for prosecutors are designated as nonpartisan.  Id. at 
606. 
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nonpartisan—for example, as umpires calling balls and strikes161—
prosecutors, who have been described as “ministers of justice,”162 often 
depict themselves in similarly neutral terms: like bloodhounds, they just 
“follow the evidence.”163 The implication is that when presented with similar 
evidence, other experienced prosecutors, as professionals, would make 
comparable charging and plea bargaining decisions. What sets prosecutors 
apart, in their view, is principally their skill in investigating and trying cases, 
not their individual approach to exercising discretion; they avoid the 
appearance that they import their own political and social policy preferences 
into their work. 
Of course, the idea that judges merely apply the law to the facts without 
regard to their own philosophies or preferences is now greeted skeptically, if 
not derisively, and the public has even greater reason to doubt that elected 
prosecutors exercise discretion uniformly based on received wisdom. The 
opacity of prosecutors’ decision-making processes and criteria,164 which 
makes pretense hard to expose, leads commentators to decry the difficulty of 
holding elected prosecutors accountable.165 One might assume that voters 
will make better-informed judgments if, like magicians revealing how they 
perform their tricks, prosecutors explain how they decide whom to charge, 
 
 161 See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Regulating Discourtesy on the Bench: A Study 
in the Evolution of Judicial Independence, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 551 (2009) 
(quoting Chief Justice Roberts at his confirmation hearings). 
 162 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). See generally 
Eric S. Fish, Against Adversary Prosecution, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1419 (2018) (arguing that 
prosecutors should serve exclusively in the role as ministers of justice and not as adversarial 
advocates). 
 163 See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Lawyers, Saying DNA Cleared Inmate, Pursue Access to 
Data, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/04/us/lawyers-saying-
dna-cleared-inmate-pursue-access-to-data.html [https://perma.cc/QH3Q-LYMU] (quoting 
executive director of prosecutors’ association: “We, as law enforcement and prosecutors, are 
obligated to seek the truth and follow the evidence.”). 
 164 See TRAIN, supra note 7, at 135 (“How, then, are the taxpayers to know a ‘good’ district 
attorney when they see one? The only answer is that they can’t.”); Bruce A. Green, 
Prosecutorial Discretion: The Difficulty and Necessity of Public Inquiry, 123 DICK. L. REV. 
589, 595 (2019). 
 165 See Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 94 
(2011) (“When voters lack meaningful information with which to check the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, efficiency and sovereignty problems arise.”); Sklansky, supra note 
115, at 671 (“If elections are to serve more than sporadically as constructive tools for 
overseeing prosecutors, voters will need better ways to evaluate prosecutors’ performance 
. . . .”). 
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what charges to bring, and what plea bargains to offer.166 Progressive 
prosecutors promise to be more transparent than traditional prosecutors.167 
What some might see as their populist tendencies—in seeming contrast to the 
Progressive Era promise to avoid popular influence—might be justified as an 
endeavor to be as open as possible about how they intend to do their work. 
Insofar as progressive prosecutors campaign on promises to exercise 
discretion differently, they distinguish themselves from many of their 
contemporaries but not necessarily from the Progressive Era prosecutors, 
who made comparable campaign pledges promising to resist the corroding 
power of partisan politics. Today’s progressive prosecutors make different 
promises. For example, they promise to resist the corroding power of racial 
bias. But both responded to their social context and to the perceived challenge 
of fair and impartial decision-making. And to the extent today’s progressive 
prosecutors avoid campaigning on how they will make charging decisions in 
any individual case to instead focus on their approaches to exercising 
discretion—as they generally but not invariably do168—concerns about 
improper popular influence diminish. The danger is that campaign promises 
to be tough on particular kinds of cases, like police shootings, can sound 
almost like promises about how prosecutors will exercise their authority in 
particular cases, since these sorts of cases tend to be rare and high-profile.169 
2. Lenity in Aid of Proportionality and Equality 
Not surprisingly, a defining feature of contemporary progressive 
prosecutors’ work, and probably the most contentious feature, is the way in 
which they exercise discretion in investigating, charging, seeking pre-trial 
 
 166 For a cautionary note, see Green & Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution, supra 
note 95, at 854–55 (arguing that the public is not well-equipped to evaluate prosecutors, that 
there are reasons to preserve the confidentiality of aspects of prosecutors’ decision-making in 
individual cases, and that the interest in accountability may be better served in ways other than 
transparency). 
 167 See, e.g., On the Issues, PARISA FOR JUST., https://parisaforjustice.com/on-the-issues/ 
[https://perma.cc/B7YQ-WHVX] (website of Parisa Dehghani-Tafti promising to “Increase 
Transparency and Accountability”). 
 168 See Sklansky, supra note 115, at 650, 673–74 (citing examples of campaigns where 
constituents wanted specific individuals indicted, and emphasizing “the risk that prosecutorial 
decision-making will become inappropriately politicized, particularly when elections focus on 
the handling or the outcome of isolated cases”). 
 169 In Atlanta, for example, District Attorney Paul L. Howard, Jr., rapidly charged an 
officer in a police shooting right before his reelection.  While many were relieved at the 
decisions, others questioned whether the DA was politically motivated.  Richard Fausset, Swift 
Charges Against Atlanta Officers Met with Relief and Skepticism, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/us/rayshard-brooks-paul-howard.html 
[https://perma.cc/R2SY-X7JR]. 
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detention, plea bargaining, sentencing, and employing alternatives to 
prosecution and incarceration. This is by no means their only distinctive 
emphasis, of course. For example, progressive prosecutors also promise to 
promote or protect certain group rights,170 to take measures to prevent or 
rectify wrongful convictions,171 and, as noted, to pursue legislative 
reforms.172 But what runs most forcefully through progressive prosecutors’ 
campaign platforms, positions, and the literature on which they draw is their 
commitment regarding the use of discretionary authority. This is 
unsurprising, since the exercise of discretion is one of the most distinctive, 
significant, and varying features of American prosecutors’ work173 and 
perhaps the most puzzling.174 
Many progressive prosecutors promise more vigorous pursuit of 
wrongdoing that—in their view—has been under-prosecuted, such as violent 
sexual offenses, government corruption, corporate crime, and police 
violence.175 But more consequential is their promise to mitigate what they 
perceive as the excessive harshness of the criminal process. The rule of lenity 
is a longstanding judicial approach to interpreting criminal statutes;176 many 
 
 170 See, e.g., A Roadmap for Reform, CHESA BOUDIN FOR DIST. ATT’Y 2019, https://web.a
rchive.org/web/20191212081103/https://www.chesaboudin.com (promising to work to 
“[p]rotect immigrant rights,” to “[t]reat sexual assault survivors with dignity,” and to “[g]ive 
crime victims a voice in every case”). 
 171 See, e.g., Wrongful Convictions Unit, CHESA BOUDIN FOR DIST. ATT’Y 2019, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20200101141322/https://www.chesaboudin.com/wrongful_conv
ictions [https://perma.cc/92N3-J7AD] (promising to “[e]stablish a Wrongful Conviction Unit 
(WCU)” as well as “an Innocence Commission of Experts to Pre-Screen Cases for the WCU”). 
 172 See, e.g., On the Issues, supra note 167 (promising to “support decriminalization and 
legalization [of marijuana use], with appropriate government regulation”). 
 173 Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of 
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 408–15 (2001).  This contrasts with prosecution in civil law 
countries, where the charging decision is largely a ministerial function.  William T. Pizzi, 
Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative 
Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L. J. 1325, 1327–28, 1331–34 
(1993). 
 174 See, e.g., Green & Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution, supra note 95, at 824–
36. 
 175 See, e.g., A Roadmap for Reform, supra note 170 (promising to work to “[t]est every 
rape kit” and “hold rapists accountable,” to “[e]ffectively prosecute police misconduct,” and 
to “[i]nvestigate and prosecute political corruption, corporate crime and landlords who break 
laws to exploit tenants”). 
 176 Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 
886, 940–41 (2004) (advocating for strict construction of criminal statutes in response to the 
overbreadth of the criminal law). 
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progressive prosecutors have adopted a different sort of lenity principle for 
prosecutorial enforcement of the criminal law.177 
Progressive prosecutors’ lenity principle can be explained, in part, as an 
attempt to minimize racial and economic injustice, exemplified by high rates 
of incarceration, particularly of poor people and minorities.178 The intent to 
use prosecutorial discretion to avoid disproportionately or unfairly burdening 
poor people and minorities is the common goal behind promises to eliminate 
or reduce applications for cash bail;179 to divert many non-violent offenders 
out of the criminal process,180 including by declining to prosecute certain 
 
 177 A dramatic example is Maine prosecutor Natasha Irving’s promise to “seek restorative 
justice solutions in all but the most violent cases.”  Beth Brogan, How a New District Attorney 




 178 See, e.g., A Roadmap for Reform, supra note 170 (promising to work to “[e]nd racist 
disparities” which “plague every step of our criminal justice system” and to “[e]nd mass 
incarceration”); see also FAIR & JUST PROSECUTION, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. & THE JUST. 
COLLABORATIVE, supra note 123, at 3–14 (stating that “punitive policies [including over-
policing of poor and minority communities] have contributed to the incarceration build-up” 
and identifying ten principles to reduce incarceration, including making diversion the rule, 
charging with restraint, encouraging “the treatment (not criminalization) of mental illness” 
and drug addiction, minimizing misdemeanors, and promoting restorative justice); id. at 16 
(giving example of Milwaukee prosecutor who, after data showed that black people were 
prosecuted disproportionately for possessing drug paraphernalia, “stopped prosecuting most 
paraphernalia cases” and instead referred people to drug treatment, thereby reducing 
disparities).  Underlying empirical assumptions about the extent to which racial disparities are 
attributable to prejudice and implicit bias in law enforcement may sometimes be difficult to 
prove.  See Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime 
and Criminal Justice in the United States, 21 CRIME & JUST. 311, 312 (1997) (discussing how 
the politically and ideologically charged debate has made it difficult to discuss, let alone 
pursue, a scholarly approach to empirical data about race and crime). 
 179 See, e.g., A Roadmap for Reform, supra note 170 (promising to work to “[e]liminate 
cash bail,” which “allows dangerous people with money to buy their way out while poor 
people languish in jail regardless of how weak the evidence is against them”); On the Issues, 
supra note 169 (promising to “[w]ork to [e]liminate [c]ash [b]ail,” and stating that “[p]eople 
should not be kept in jail simply because they are poor”). 
 180 See, e.g., Focusing Resources on Serious & Violent Felonies and Holding 100% of 
DUI’s Accountable, CHESA BOUDIN FOR DIST. ATT’Y 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/
20191220223447/https://www.chesaboudin.com/violent_crime [https://perma.cc/QJ7H-
77H2] (promising to “Expand Neighborhood Courts[,] . . . access to PreTrial Diversion[, 
and] . . . use of Deferred Entry of [Judgment]”). 
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categories of crimes;181 and to focus on prosecuting violent felons.182 But 
progressive prosecutors’ lenity also reflects a belief, like that of the 
Progressive Era prosecutors, that for many offenders there are no sharp 
distinctions between social problems, mental health problems, and criminal 
conduct, and that the public interest, including public safety, is often best 
served by rehabilitative and social services. This helps explain progressive 
prosecutors’ support for alternatives to prosecution and incarceration, such 
as drug and mental health treatment and restorative justice.183 Also like 
Progressive Era reformers, progressive prosecutors are committed to a data-
based approach. They have promised to collect and release data both to show 
how their policies are being implemented and to enable themselves and 
others to attempt to measure the impact.184 
Progressive prosecutors’ commitment to lenity has echoes in the 
Progressive Era approach. The Progressive Era movement also invoked the 
rhetoric of leniency, although not so centrally, and its concept drew in part 
on a commitment to fair treatment of the poor.185 But on the surface, the 
progressive prosecutors’ principle of lenity as the norm or presumption for 
certain offenses, rather than as the occasional exception intended to conserve 
resources or to avoid grossly unfair or excessive punishment, departs from 
the approach of the Progressive Era prosecutors. Prosecutors have 
traditionally been expected to serve a gate-keeping function to avoid 
 
 181 See, e.g., On the Issues, supra note 167 (promising “not [to] prosecute simple 
possession of marijuana”). 
 182 See, e.g., Focusing Resources on Serious & Violent Felonies and Holding 100% of 
DUI’s Accountable, supra note 180 (promising to “[f]ocus [r]esources on [s]erious [and] 
[v]iolent [f]elonies”). 
 183 See, e.g., Replace Jail with Mental Health Care, CHESA BOUDIN FOR DIST. ATT’Y 2019, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20191229164958/https://www.chesaboudin.com/mental_health 
[https://perma.cc/P6LU-X4CY] (promising to work to “implement a comprehensive 
transformation of the criminal justice system to decriminalize and treat mental illness, housing 
instability and substance use as public health issues rather than criminal justice issues”). 
 184 See, e.g., Matt Daniels, The Kim Foxx Effect: How Prosecutions Have Changed in 
Cook County, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 24, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.
org/2019/10/24/the-kim-foxx-effect-how-prosecutions-have-changed-in-cook-county 
[https://perma.cc/K574-ZK9W] (Chicago’s Kim Foxx “released six years of data” regarding 
felony prosecutions which showed that “she turned away more than 5,000 cases that would 
have been pursued by” her predecessor, “mostly by declining to prosecute low-level 
shoplifting and drug offenses and by diverting more cases to alternative treatment programs”); 
Catherine Elton, The Law According to Rachael Rollins, BOSTON (Aug. 6, 2019, 9:47 AM), 
https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2019/08/06/rachael-rollins/ [https://perma.cc/85J9-
XFT8] (reporting that Suffolk County DA Rachael Rollins “hired a data scientist to analyze 
past performance and measure the impact of new policies, something she says no other DA in 
the state is doing”). 
 185 See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
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prosecuting innocent individuals,186 and norms of prosecutorial 
professionalism have long reflected the importance of avoiding public 
pressure to bring charges without adequate proof.187 But for Progressive Era 
reformers, rigorous enforcement of criminal law (when supported by the 
proof) was the antidote to lawlessness, arbitrariness, and partisanship.188 
Progressive Era reformers expected equality to flow from a professional 
approach to law enforcement. They were committed to equal treatment of the 
rich and the poor, which they believed would naturally follow from the anti-
corruption effort as well as the focus on the treatment, as opposed to 
punishment, of offenders. 
The lenity rule also departs, although less sharply, from the exercise of 
discretion by contemporary, mainstream prosecutors who built on the 
Progressive Era legacy of professionalism. For mainstream prosecutors, 
decisions to refrain from prosecuting offenders where there is adequate proof 
have been the exception, not the norm. These decisions were conventionally 
made on an individual, case-by-case basis, not categorically.189 
Progressive Era prosecutors believed that equal treatment would follow 
from the successful effort to prevent arbitrary and partisan charging 
 
 186 See, e.g., Rush v. Cavanaugh, 2 Pa. 187, 189–90 (1845). 
 187 See, e.g., Green & Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution, supra note 95, at 838 
(“[P]rosecutors have a duty to avoid convicting innocent people, which may require declining 
to bring charges in light of their own professional doubts about an individual’s guilt, even if 
the public is clamoring for a prosecution.”). 
 188 See TRAIN, supra note 7, at 119–20 (asserting that district attorneys “go bad” when 
they “abandon[] the real and only test, which should be applied—namely, that of deciding 
whether the complainant, come to him for relief, has suffered a violation of his rights. Once a 
prosecutor gets inoculated with the virus of arbitrary power he becomes the tool of rascals, of 
politicians, and of his own ambitions alike.”).  But see id. at 132–33 (recognizing that a 
prosecutor cannot “bother[] himself with every trifling offense” because prosecutors have 
limited resources and because there are “so many statutes and ordinances that there is hardly 
anybody who does not violate some one of them every day of his life”). 
 189 See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined 
Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 558–62 (1999) 
(explaining that federal prosecutors’ charging decisions depend on many factors); Pre-Trial 
Diversion, ST. JOSEPH CTY.,   https://www.stjoepros.org/697/Pre-Trial-Diversion [https://per
ma.cc/QQ8E-E4SA] (“Eligibility for the [pre-trial diversion] program is determined by the 
deputy prosecutor assigned to the case and on a case-by-case basis.”).  For example, in death 
penalty jurisdictions, prosecutors generally make case-by-case determinations of whether to 
pursue the death penalty in homicide cases that, on the facts, are eligible for capital 
punishment. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 691 P.2d 929, 942–44 (Wash. 1984) (rejecting 
constitutional challenge that authorizes prosecutors to seek the death penalty in eligible cases 
on an ad hoc basis); see also Logan Sawyer, Reform Prosecutors and Separation of Powers, 
72 OKLA. L. REV. 603, 633–34 (2020) (concluding that it is preferable for prosecutors to be 
transparent about their categorical policies and practices—e.g., a policy never to seek the death 
penalty—rather than purporting to make discretionary decisions on a case-by-case basis). 
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decisions. Professionalism would ensure that the rich did not get an unfair 
advantage over the poor. By the mid-twentieth century, the legacy of 
Progressive Era reform was largely taken for granted. Prosecutors came to 
assume that, as professionals, they could avoid the influence of partisan 
politics and other impermissible or irrelevant considerations when making 
charging decisions, while still making distinctions based on legitimate 
criteria. As a New Jersey judge explained in 1952, the ad hoc exercise of 
discretion is “the everyday function of a prosecutor,” who may decline or 
dismiss prosecutions for any of countless different reasons but whose 
decisions “are unexceptionable if made in good faith.”190 Eventually, 
particularly in urban prosecutors’ offices, internal policies governing 
charging and plea bargaining decisions in recurring types of cases were 
developed with the aim of providing further protection against arbitrariness 
and favoritism.191 
Although lenity therefore is not unique to the contemporary progressive 
prosecutors, their rationale for lenity seems to set them apart. Mainstream 
prosecutors have long declined to prosecute based on forensic and 
administrative considerations—for example, because an offender was more 
useful as a witness, because a government witness became unavailable, or 
because a prosecution was simply not worth the cost.192 Many also 
implemented a principle of proportionality—e.g., declining to prosecute, or 
to prosecute as vigorously as the law and facts permit, to mitigate the 
excessive harshness of the criminal process.193 And many also sought to 
implement a principle of equality—i.e., to treat similarly situated individuals 
 
 190 State v. Winne, 91 A.2d 65, 78 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1952), rev’d, 96 A.2d 63 
(N.J. 1953). 
 191 See generally Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1971). 
 192 FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME 
253–59 (1970) (discussing the decision not to charge because of the suspect’s willingness to 
cooperate); id. at 159 (“[T]here is general recognition everywhere that resources are simply 
not adequate to fully enforce every penal law. Recognition of the necessity for charging 
discretion, therefore, is most widespread in terms of limited resources.”). 
 193 Id. at 186 (“Obviously guilty persons may not be charged when, in the judgment of the 
police or prosecutor, the consequences of prosecution and conviction seem unduly harmful in 
relation to the criminal conduct involved or the social and economic circumstances of the 
suspect.”).  In cases involving low-level offenders, state and federal prosecutors have 
employed formal and informal diversion programs, in which charges are deferred and 
ultimately declined or dismissed upon satisfaction of conditions such as payment of restitution 
or refraining from further criminal conduct.  See United States v. Flowers, 983 F. Supp. 159, 
161–65 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (describing the history and use of deferred prosecution). 
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equally.194 In doing so, mainstream prosecutors have cultivated the 
appearance that prosecuting is apolitical and that discretionary decisions are 
made by reference to time-honored professional values and understandings. 
Insofar as today’s progressive prosecutors are implementing different 
charging criteria from their mainstream counterparts, it is not entirely clear 
whether their approach to prosecutorial discretion is different in principle. 
Progressive prosecutors might be understood to be applying ordinary, 
accepted principles of charging discretion. What is different may not be how 
they conceptualize their role or, in particular, the principles governing their 
exercise of discretionary power, but how they see the criminal process and 
the wider world in which they perform their work. Progressive prosecutors 
make different judgments from their mainstream contemporaries regarding 
when punishment is necessary to serve the public interest because they think 
the public interest is often better served by an alternative to prosecution and 
punishment. Further, they have a different social understanding about when 
similarly situated individuals are being treated differently: they perceive that 
implicit racial bias and structural racism pervade the criminal process, often 
making it unjust to apply criminal laws as strictly as law and facts would 
allow.195 
Progressive prosecutors view the colorblind approach of their 
predecessors as inadequate given their understanding of how racial bias 
defines the system. In other words, the professional approach might promise 
to treat like individuals alike, regardless of particular characteristics like race. 
But a progressive prosecutor will be wary of how even this seemingly fair 
approach might have a different impact on African-American communities. 
For instance, a mainstream prosecutor might offer a more lenient plea to a 
white defendant with no prior convictions than an African American who had 
been arrested previously for a nonviolent crime. A progressive prosecutor, 
understanding how policing policies target young black men, might offer the 
same deal to both.  
In focusing on the social impact of crime and criminal justice, 
progressive prosecutors build on the legacy of Progressive Era reformers, 
who introduced the notion that crime is a social rather than an individual 
problem. Of course, at least some Progressive Era reformers also looked at 
heredity and race as the source of criminality—a stark contrast from today’s 
progressive prosecutors who would all certainly condemn any such theory. 
 
 194 Green, supra note 164, at 611–13 (“[P]rosecutors generally agree that they should not 
make arbitrary distinctions among cases—that is, similar cases should be treated similarly.”). 
 195 See Gold, supra note 165, at 118 (“Allocating prosecutorial resources away from 
small-time drug offenders could . . . reduce racial disparity in the criminal justice system.”). 
2020] WHEN PROSECUTORS POLITICK 757 
3. Categorical Presumptions of Lenity 
Progressive Era reformers and contemporary progressive prosecutors 
were equally concerned about two different systems of justice: one for the 
poor and one for the rich. Progressive Era prosecutors believed that the main 
source of the problem was corruption. Contemporary progressive 
prosecutors, however, see the problem as more insidious—the result of 
implicit bias and other forms of discrimination. To address the problem of 
unequal justice, Progressive Era reformers primarily sought to root out 
corruption and implement fair and professional procedures. Contemporary 
progressive prosecutors, among other things, advance lenity, refusing in 
some cases to prosecute entire categories of crimes. 
Progressive prosecutors’ efforts to implement their vision of the public 
good through presumptions against prosecuting certain crimes, such as 
marijuana possession, are particularly controversial.196 This policy seems 
distinctive not just because of its lenity, but also because of the categorical 
approach to discretionary decision making in which lenity is the norm for 
certain categories of criminal conduct. Mainstream prosecutors, even those 
who approve of lenity, tend to take a case-by-case approach.197 In other 
words, in mainstream contemporary prosecution, it tends to be the individual 
that invites the forgiving treatment, not a social situation as a whole. Their 
implicit understanding is that the legislative judgment to criminalize conduct, 
thereby subjecting it to criminal prosecution, is generally entitled to respect. 
 
 196 Following Rachael Rollins’s election as Boston prosecutor, the National Police 
Association filed a complaint with the Massachusetts disciplinary authority, alleging that 
Rollins’s campaign promise not to charge certain crimes reflected a “reckless disregard of the 
laws.”  Letter from the National Police Association to Constance V. Vecchione, Office of the 
Bar Counsel (Dec. 23, 2018), https://nationalpolice.org/dev/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/
DA_Rachael_Rollins_Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CHK-ZARQ].  Nonetheless, Rollins 
implemented her controversial pledge. See RACHAEL ROLLINS, SUFFOLK CTY. DIST. ATT’Y., 
THE RACHAEL ROLLINS POLICY MEMO app. C (2019), http://files.suffolkdistrictattorney.com/
The-Rachael-Rollins-Policy-Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2QR-YLLT] (listing fifteen 
offenses that will presumptively not be charged, including marijuana possession, shoplifting, 
and trespass, subject to identified exceptions and factors for consideration). 
 197 See Stuart Diamond, The Law; Prosecutorial Discretion: Worthy of Defense?, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 22, 1988), https://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/22/us/the-law-prosecutorial-
discretion-worthy-of-defense.html [https://perma.cc/SZ3C-QNQX] (“The discretion afforded 
American prosecutors is defended on the ground that it provides for case-by-case flexibility 
and ultimately more leniency for deserving defendants.”); Memorandum from N.J. Att’y Gen. 
Gurbir S. Grewal on Guidance Regarding Municipal Prosecutors’ Discretion in Prosecuting 
Marijuana and Other Criminal Offenses (Aug. 29, 2018), https://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases18/2
018-0829_AG-Memorandum.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZD6-8T8R] (directing that municipal 
prosecutors may not categorically decline to prosecute marijuana offenses but may decide on 
a case-by-case basis to recommend that the court accept a plea to a lesser or other offense or 
to recommend that eligible defendants be accepted into diversion programs). 
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Legislatures contemplate that prosecutors will exercise discretion when 
enforcing the criminal law. Therefore, it does not undermine the legislature 
to decline to prosecute some individuals who are provably guilty of offenses 
to conserve limited resources. The prosecutor is still deferring to the 
legislature because the objectives of the criminal law can be achieved without 
punishment, the benefits of prosecution might outweigh the harms, or the 
legislative purpose may not be served for other reasons particular to the 
individual and the circumstances of the case. But adopting a categorical 
policy not to prosecute conduct that the legislature has said is a crime might 
seem to countermand the legislative judgment and thus comprise a failure to 
faithfully execute the law.198 
At least with respect to marijuana cases, one might argue that 
progressive prosecutors are simply a step ahead of the state legislatures, 
which is legitimate when legislatures are slow to repeal laws that become 
unworthy of enforcement in light of changing social understandings.199 
Progressive prosecutors were not the first to stop prosecuting individuals for 
possessing small amounts of marijuana in states that had not yet 
decriminalized its personal use and possession.200 In generally forgoing 
prosecutions of marijuana possession, progressive prosecutors might be said 
to follow in the footsteps of earlier prosecutors who declined to prosecute 
outmoded victimless crimes such as lewd cohabitation, adultery, and similar 
sex offenses involving consenting adults. But this does not explain why, for 
example, Boston’s Rachael Rollins adopted a presumption against 
prosecuting trespassing and shoplifting.201 No one would suggest that the 
underlying conduct should be allowed, much less that it has become socially 
acceptable. Rather, Rollins’s rationale is that public safety can be protected 
more effectively by alternative approaches.202 
 
 198 Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L REV. 671, 
705 (2014) (“[C]ategorical nonenforcement for policy reasons usurps Congress’s function of 
embodying national policy in law; it effectively curtails the statute that Congress enacted, 
replacing it with a narrower prohibition.”). 
 199 See Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 225 
(2007) (“[W]hen legislatures leave out-dated crimes on the books, other components of 
democratic governance compensate: politically accountable prosecutors rarely prosecute (and 
thus effectively nullify) many crimes the public cares little about—and that scholars complain 
about.”); Melissa J. Mitchell, Comment, Cleaning Out the Closet: Using Sunset Provisions to 
Clean Up Cluttered Criminal Codes, 54 EMORY L. REV. 1671, 1680–83 (2005) (discussing the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion to account for shifting social norms). 
 200 See Gold, supra note 165, at 115–17. 
 201 See ROLLINS, supra note 196, at app. D-1. 
 202 Id. at 4–6 (“Sweeping advances in data science and public health have revealed that 
decades of punitive incarceration are not effectively preventing recidivism and promoting 
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To critics, underenforcement jeopardizes public safety.203 Progressive 
prosecutors disagree. For example, Rollins has asserted, with distinct echoes 
of Progressive Era prosecutors, that “protect[ing] the community’s 
safety . . . is best accomplished when the office first considers solutions that 
direct those in need of treatment—mental health, substance use disorder, or 
otherwise—to available resources, minimize court involvement, and keep 
people free of criminal records and able to work and function without 
government oversight.”204 There is insufficient data to resolve the empirical 
disagreement.205 Progressive prosecutors may be rejecting mainstream 
prosecutors’ empirical assumptions or predictions and leaving it to future 
study to decide whose guess is correct. But they are not necessarily rejecting 
the conventional conception of prosecutors’ role in exercising discretionary 
power. Once convinced that an individual is provably guilty of a crime, 
prosecutors are supposed to decide whether to pursue a prosecution based 
principally on the need to protect the public and on other public interests, 
such as economy and fairness, that may point in different directions. 
Progressive prosecutors might argue that they are simply weighing interests 
differently or striking a different balance. 
Critics also challenge this approach as anti-democratic.206 While state 
legislators understand and anticipate that prosecutors will decline to 
 
public safety.  A large number of criminal convictions secured by prosecutors nationally are 
for drug, property, and public order offenses, which are often driven by economic, mental 
health, and social needs . . . .  Data show that a carceral approach to low-level, non-violent 
offenses can do more harm than good . . . .  As a result, jurisdictions across the country are 
taking a smarter approach to punishment and accountability.  Law enforcement agencies and 
prosecutors’ offices are collecting and analyzing new and varied sources of data, and they are 
safely beginning to move all but the most serious offenses away from carceral punishment and 
its downstream collateral harms.”). 
 203 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 1 (detailing criticisms of progressive prosecutors’ 
policies in Boston, Dallas, Philadelphia, and San Antonio, including accusations that lenient 
enforcement policies will create “lawlessness” and a “public safety crisis” and will lead to 
more crime and more victims). 
 204 ROLLINS, supra note 196, at app. C-1.  As historians of Progressive Era criminal justice 
reform would argue, however, the substitution of private voluntary organizations for 
government punishment involves a shift in policing rather than an elimination of social control 
entirely.  See WILLRICH, supra note 21, at xxi–xxxix. 
 205 See Berman, supra note 1 (quoting Professor Richard Berk’s observation that it is too 
soon to measure the impact of progressive prosecutors’ policies on crime rates). 
 206 See, e.g., Steve Volk, Larry Krasner vs. Everybody: Inside the Philly DA’s Crusade to 
Revolutionize Criminal Justice, PHILA. (Nov. 23, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://www.phillymag.co
m/news/2019/11/23/larry-krasner-criminal-justice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/YK26-DUKJ] 
(recounting U.S. Attorney Bill McSwain’s criticisms of Philadelphia prosecutor Larry 
Krasner, including “that Krasner has ‘abdicated’ his responsibility as a prosecutor and 
disrespected democracy by failing to enforce the law as it’s been passed down to him”); see 
also Foster, supra note 132, at 2534–45. 
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prosecute some individual offenders, one might assume that they do not 
expect prosecutors to decline to prosecute whole categories of offenses; 
Otherwise, the legislature would not have adopted the law in the first place. 
At least at one time, it might have been considered nonfeasance for a 
prosecutor to categorically refuse to investigate or prosecute certain crimes, 
rather than making good faith decisions among individual cases.207 Today, 
prosecutors’ decisions not to prosecute whole categories of crimes, absent 
exceptional circumstances, might be viewed as a repudiation of the 
legislature’s intent—and therefore the democratic will—underlying the 
relevant criminal laws. Even more difficult to square with legislative intent 
would be situations where prosecutors absolutely decline to bring certain 
charges.208 An example is the Orlando prosecutor’s decision never to seek 
the death sentence—that is, never to bring charges of capital murder.209 
Bellin’s answer is that exercising discretion leniently is a legitimate and 
lawful check on state power to punish, and there is nothing amiss in starting 
with an understanding that leniency will be the norm with respect to certain 
criminal conduct.210 Even if a state legislature does not endorse this approach, 
the authority to adopt it is implicit in prosecutors’ state constitutional status 
as executive branch officials. While one can debate whether any given 
prosecutor is exercising this power wisely or abusively—and the electorate 
can ultimately resolve this question for itself through the democratic 
process211—there is nothing generally anomalous or anti-democratic about a 
presumption that charges will not be pursued in a category of cases. 
There are analogues in mainstream prosecutors’ work. For example, the 
federal and state prosecution of tax crimes—willful failure to file federal or 
state tax, willful failure to declare income, false statements in tax filings, and 
the like—is surely the exception, not the rule. Mostly, the problem is left to 
civil tax authorities to address. But prosecutors diverge from this practice at 
times, for example, if the tax evader is a repeat offender or—as in Al 
Capone’s case—is guilty of more serious but unprovable crimes,212 the 
 
 207 See, e.g., State v. Winne, 96 A.2d 63 78–79 (1953) (upholding indictment of local 
prosecutor for nonfeasance for failing to prosecute individuals for operating gambling 
establishments). 
 208 See Bellin, supra note 118, at 1249. 
 209 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 210 Bellin, supra note 107, at 29; Bellin, supra note 118, at 1248. 
 211 While it is impossible to know why some would-be progressive prosecutors were 
defeated at the polls, the answer may be, in part, that voters regarded their proposed policies 
as unwise. 
 212 Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the 
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 583 (2005). 
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offender has a special obligation to the tax law,213 or the nature or extent of 
wrongdoing is particularly egregious. Arguably, progressive prosecutors and 
mainstream prosecutors simply make different judgments about when a rule 
of lenity should apply. 
4. Holistic Prosecuting 
Finally, today’s progressive prosecutors seem different from many of 
their contemporaries in their broad—if not holistic—conception of their role, 
which follows from their conception of the role of criminal law in society.214 
Conventional prosecutors are primarily case processors: their assigned role 
is to decide whom to prosecute and how.215 They leave it to civil government 
agencies to decide how to deal with the mental health or social problems that 
might influence offenders’ wrongdoing. But progressive prosecutors tend to 
see criminal problems as interconnected with other social problems—an 
insight pioneered by the Progressive Era reformers and reinforced more 
recently with the advent of drug courts and other diversion programs for 
nonviolent offenders. This explains, at least in part, progressive prosecutors’ 
conviction that providing mental health and social services to offenders 
rather than prosecuting and imprisoning them can sometimes promote public 
safety at lower individual and public cost. They champion diversion 
programs in which offenders are offered entry into treatment as an alternative 
to prosecution and the risk of incarceration.216 This is not an innovation, but 
rather a recent incarnation of the Progressive Era approach to crime as a 
social problem. In turning away from a more draconian nineteenth-century 
conception of individual responsibility and crime, the Progressive Era 
reformers involved the state in a more intricate way in policing individual 
 
 213 See, e.g., United States v. Swanson, 509 F.2d 1205, 1208–09 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding 
it was a proper exercise of discretion to selectively enforce criminal tax laws against lawyers 
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 214 Much has been written about holistic, or comprehensive, criminal defense 
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lives. The welfare state itself, as the historian Michael Willrich has argued, 
was born in part of this concept of criminal justice.217 
While progressive prosecutors are more committed to alternatives to 
prosecution and incarceration, many conventional prosecutors also employ 
diversion programs. Contemporary prosecutors are involved in social 
engineering in other respects as well. For example, federal prosecutors in 
corporate criminal cases use non-prosecution and deferred prosecution 
agreements to induce corporations to rehabilitate themselves by adopting 
internal structural reforms. And “community prosecutors” have used 
criminal power to address social problems, such as vagrancy, that might 
ordinarily have been addressed by civil authorities.218 One might argue that 
strict case processing is becoming the exception. The difference for 
progressive prosecutors may simply be in how they tackle social problems 
and which ones they prioritize. 
III. LESSONS FROM HISTORY 
Even though the two criminal justice reform movements, separated by 
about a century, significantly diverge in goals and substance, progressive 
prosecutors can both take inspiration from their predecessors and learn from 
them. We close by drawing from Progressive Era criminal justice reform to 
offer a few such lessons. 
Progressive Era prosecutors such as William Travers Jerome faced the 
challenge of reconciling professionalism with a movement closely tied to 
popular support, and contemporary progressive prosecutors face a similar 
challenge. To the extent that the dictates of professionalism lead to results 
that win popular support there may be little problem, but progressive 
prosecutors will not always be so fortunate, particularly because 
prosecutorial professionalism often calls for making individual decisions 
based on evidence that is inaccessible to the public. 
 
 217 See generally WILLRICH, supra note 21 (arguing that the advent of the welfare state 
was rooted in the Progressive Era concept of criminality, which justified a greater intrusion of 
the government in the lives of immigrants and the poor). 
 218 Bruce A. Green & Alafair S. Burke, The Community Prosecutor: Questions of 
Professional Discretion, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 285, 291–92 (2012) (“Community 
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community representatives and agencies to address these problems through a project, policy, 
or strategy, often involving nontraditional methods.”); see also Green, supra note 215, at 1196 
(“[W]here vagrancy is the result of poverty or homelessness, a prosecutor must determine 
whether the state should respond through criminal prosecutions or whether social welfare 
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While progressive prosecutors embrace policy priorities that win 
popular support, and the public may have an interest in ensuring that 
prosecutors implement these policies as promised, the public is in a bad 
position to assess how policy priorities play out in individual cases, even with 
greater transparency. Consequently, professionalism often calls for ignoring 
or even disappointing popular calls for results in individual cases: 
prosecutorial decisions in particular cases ought to be made by professionally 
independent prosecutors based on the evidence and applicable, articulable 
principles and policies. As we learned from the Progressive Era reformers, 
independence from the public and the political establishment goes to the core 
objective of the prosecutor’s role: exercising discretion on behalf of the 
public based on a professional commitment to assess the evidence objectively 
and make decisions in a fair and even-handed way.219 But it is harder to 
achieve that independence when prosecutors garner popular support with a 
particular agenda. 
Particularly given that strong social movements have helped propel 
progressive prosecutors to victory, the public may expect charging and plea-
bargaining decisions in individual cases to conform to its preferences. For 
example, the public may perceive that progressive prosecutors, who were 
elected against the background of the #MeToo movement, abandon their 
campaign promises if they fail to charge or convict powerful defendants in 
high-profile sexual-abuse cases. Likewise, given the popular progressive 
conviction that mainstream prosecutors mishandled cases of police violence 
against civilians, a progressive prosecutor’s constituency may feel betrayed 
by a progressive prosecutor who fails to successfully prosecute violence by 
police, even when from the prosecutor’s perspective, the result is dictated by 
law and fact. Part of the legacy of Progressive Era criminal justice reform is 
that public preferences should not govern criminal justice outcomes in 
individual cases, and contemporary prosecutors undoubtedly share this 
understanding. But in making evidence-based decisions, especially the 
decision not to charge, progressive prosecutors may disappoint their 
constituencies. Conversely, progressive prosecutors may be influenced by 
public pressure in subtle and unacknowledged ways. As recent controversies 
in federal criminal prosecution remind us, prosecutors’ independence from 
those who put them in office cannot be accepted as a given.220 
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One lesson may be that prosecutors should discourage unreasonable 
expectations. While nuance is not normally a feature of the stump speech, 
progressive prosecutors today should be careful in their campaign rhetoric 
not to promise too much in terms of results in particular types of cases and to 
remind and educate the public about the nature of the criminal process. This 
may not be easy, given that races for prosecutorial office are competitive and 
social media encourages the publication of brief, popular sentiments, but 
progressive prosecutors committed to the values of professionalism and 
progressive policies ought to emphasize both. 
Another challenge is suggested by a point of contrast between the 
current era and the Progressive Era—the challenge of preserving professional 
values while implementing new, progressive policies. In some offices, upon 
a progressive prosecutor’s election, there has been a purge of career 
prosecutors.221 This is not entirely surprising. To change the office culture, 
newly elected prosecutors might understandably replace prosecutors who are 
hostile to new policies and practices or encourage them to leave. But this is 
where today’s progressive prosecutors might be expected to take a different 
approach from Progressive Era prosecutors who had a powerful incentive to 
replace incompetent staff members who got their jobs through the political 
machine. Prosecutors’ offices have come a long way since then, and even 
where progressive prosecutors disagree with their predecessors’ approach to 
questions of policy, they are likely to benefit from career prosecutors’ 
institutional memory, relationships with the court, and commitment to 
internal policies and practices that promote enduring professional values 
(e.g., avoiding wrongful convictions, candor to the court, fair process) that 
progressive prosecutors wish to preserve. While retaining career prosecutors 
might be problematic in that it can slow the pace of progressive change, 
continuity can also serve to ensure that professional values are maintained.222 
Progressive prosecutors’ fresh perspectives as outsiders may be useful in 
changing a recalcitrant institutional culture, but, given the importance of 
preserving professionalism, progressive prosecutors may be better served by 
converting at least some career prosecutors rather than replacing them. 
In addition to avoiding all-out purges of personnel, progressive 
prosecutors should be careful not to cut procedural or ethical corners in order 




 221 See, e.g., Palmer, Shaw & Dean, supra note 130. 
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traditions, and ethical rules not only ensure fair results, they also reassure the 
public about the legitimacy of the process. This reassurance is particularly 
important because the progressive platform is controversial, and political 
opponents might look for reasons to question the legitimacy of particular 
outcomes. Chicago prosecutor Kimberly Foxx’s departure from convention 
in Jussie Smollett’s case is a stark example, which may have done more harm 
to the progressive cause than good.223 Following established norms, policies, 
and practices helps reassure the public that the resolution of a case is fair. 
And this sort of legitimacy is critical, particularly in a high-profile, politically 
charged case such as Smollett’s. 
A similar tension between professionalism and populism may arise, not 
only in individual cases, but with respect to progressive prosecutors’ 
charging policies, such as a policy to divert individuals arrested for marijuana 
possession to social programs. In advancing alternatives to incarceration, 
contemporary progressive prosecutors are taking a page from the Progressive 
Era playbook. But prosecutorial policies are not legitimate merely because 
they enjoy popular support. While some may see popular support as 
conferring democratic legitimacy on lenity policies, such as a policy against 
prosecuting possession of marijuana for personal use, popular support is 
neither a necessary nor sufficient justification. A lesson of the Progressive 
Era, with its emphasis on professionalism over populism, was that 
prosecutors should set policy priorities—for example, prioritizing corruption 
prosecutions—based on the same sorts of professional values (e.g., 
proportionality and even-handed justice) that govern decision making in 
individual cases.224  
While diversion programs have persisted for so long in part because of 
evidence pointing to their effectiveness, they are also imperfect and often of 
unproven use. They may have unintended negative consequences.225 The 
Progressive Era has taught us that blind faith in the association between 
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criminal justice and private organizations is misplaced.226 Social programs, 
such as diversion programs, advanced by prosecutors can be an improvement 
over harsh carceral punishment but may still be a problematic form of social 
control. They invariably involve a greater degree of government supervision 
and involvement in the daily lives of individuals, especially the poor and 
minorities.227 Putting too much faith in these sorts of programs, as the 
Progressive Era reformers did, may lead to disappointment or to the creation 
of unanticipated problems. While experimentation is laudatory, today’s 
progressive prosecutors have a responsibility to follow up by collecting data 
(as many have promised to do) and then by fixing or replacing what does not 
work. Ultimately, evidence-based judgments about whether, as a matter of 
policy, to pursue alternatives to prosecution in particular classes of cases 
should be made by elected prosecutors—not by public referendum—against 
the background of professional criminal-justice values and expectations, not 
based exclusively on social policy preferences. 
CONCLUSION 
Although Progressive Era reformers and today’s reform-oriented 
progressive prosecutors are separated by about a century and much has 
changed over that time, a comparison between them provides some 
interesting and important insights. This is so for two reasons. First, 
progressive prosecutors inherit important traditions and legacies from the 
Progressive Era movement, and, second, both groups of prosecutors were 
elected on a wave of popular support. Progressive Era prosecutors and 
today’s progressive prosecutors, unlike most of today’s mainstream 
prosecutors, were elected by a politically active, mobilized, and vigilant 
segment of the public. It is a sign of a healthy democracy when those affected 
by criminal justice policy are active and involved in the nature of its 
implementation. But, at the same time, this direct involvement can pose a 
threat to prosecutorial independence. Because prosecutors’ decisions in 
individual cases are—and ought to be—driven by complex considerations of 
fact and law, they are not well-suited to popular oversight. Some degree of 
insulation is necessary to ensure fairness in individual cases. Prosecutorial 
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independence is under greater strain when the prosecutor has been elected by 
a populist movement. 
The task of the Progressive Era prosecutors was to replace the corrupt 
and incompetent uses of criminal authority by prosecutors controlled by 
political machines. In contrast, today’s progressive prosecutors, although 
also reformers, are not promoting wholesale change. While the progressive 
prosecutors of this century share their predecessors’ concern for the broader 
social context in which the criminal law is enforced, they do not make a 
priority of improving the efficiency or professionalism of their staff, as did 
the Progressive Era reformers. They seem instead to accept the expectations 
of prosecutorial professionalism, including prosecutorial independence, that 
are a legacy of the Progressive Era. Their emphasis is on the enunciation and 
implementation of internal policies and practices—particularly those 
promoting lenity through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion with respect 
to diversion, charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing——that, in their 
view, better express the aspirations of the criminal justice process. 
Thus, current progressive prosecutors do not see themselves as rejecting 
or reinterpreting the principles of prosecutorial professionalism that they 
inherited from their mainstream contemporaries. They can argue that their 
reform agenda simply expresses their conviction that mainstream prosecutors 
do not adequately meet professional expectations in practice, or that 
mainstream prosecutors have not adequately applied general professional 
norms to the particular social and criminal-justice problems of the day. 
Progressive prosecutors’ innovations—even such sharp departures as the 
wholesale diversion of certain classes of criminal cases out of the criminal 
justice system—can largely be justified in terms of now-conventional 
professional norms of prosecutorial discretion. They point to data to support 
their argument that the concerns that all prosecutors share for the public 
safety and the well-being of the community are better served, in certain 
classes of cases, by alternatives to incarceration.228 
But at the same time, there is a risk that—however newly-elected 
prosecutors might rationalize their reform agendas—they will be tempted to 
conform to the expectations of those who elected them to office. Many of 
their constituents may focus more on the particular decisions made by 
progressive prosecutors in individual cases than on whether the decision-
making process is principled, fact based and data driven. Progressive 
prosecutors’ challenge as elected officials will be, when professional 
principles demand, to make unpopular as well as popular decisions, while 
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striving to preserve popular support. As the Progressive Era prosecutors 
learned, that is no easy task. 
